

The University of Chicago

A COMPARISON OF THE
PHILOSOPHIES OF F. C. S. SCHILLER
AND JOHN DEWEY

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
OF THE DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES IN
CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR
OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

1938

By

STEPHEN SOLOMON WHITE

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CHAPTER I

INSTRUMENTALISM AND HUMANISM AS PHASES OF PRAGMATISM

The Purpose of This Chapter

Instrumentalism and humanism, the respective names of Dewey's and Schiller's philosophies, have been classified as phases of the general movement in philosophy known as pragmatism.¹ They have certain common factors which justify this classification. It is the purpose of this chapter to point out these common features.

Instrumentalism and Humanism as Reactions to Absolute Idealism

Instrumentalism and humanism agree in the fact that they both are reactions to absolute idealism. Dewey outlines the factors which were influential in bringing about his change from absolutism to instrumentalism in an essay entitled, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism." In this article we learn that his trend toward instrumentalism was a reaction against what he considered to be a weakness in himself. This weakness was the natural attraction which Hegelianism with its schematic and formally logical character had for him.² In an earlier article entitled, "Con-

¹Frederick Cannong Scott Schiller, an Englishman, was born in 1864 and died in 1937. He was educated at Rugby, Balliol College, Oxford, and Cornell University in America. He taught philosophy at Oxford for nearly two decades. From 1929 until his death, he taught half of each year at the University of Southern California. He became a pragmatist early in his career. He was England's most distinguished leader in this field of thought. John Dewey, an American, was born in 1859. He was educated at the University of Vermont and Johns Hopkins University. He began his teaching career at the University of Michigan. After a brief stay there he went to the University of Chicago and later to Columbia University. He became Emeritus Professor of Philosophy there in 1930. Dewey also became a pragmatist early in his career. He has come to be widely known in this and other countries as an educator and philosopher.

²John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," Contem-

cerning Novelties in Logic: A Reply to Mr. Robinson," Dewey states that Bosanquet's unempirical method of showing the practical nature of judgment was a considerable factor in leading him "to the conception of the ultimate practical reference of all judgments."¹ He adds in a footnote to his article that Bradley's discussion of the same subject had a like effect, but in a much less degree.² Again, we see that Dewey's movement toward pragmatism was a specific reaction to the idealistic logic.

Schiller undoubtedly refers to the early influence of absolute idealism on him when he writes thus: "In the days when I was young, and had innocently allowed myself to be indoctrinated with the traditional illusions of philosophers about the rationality of man. . . ."³ However, he soon began to have misgivings. This is indicated by what he had to say as to his introduction to philosophy. It was by way of Green's thought and the result was not what was intended. He says:

I was shocked (as I still am) by the total indifference to scientific truth, and more especially to the progress of biological knowledge which Green and other idealists appeared to me to display. I also found that their doctrine had no spiritual value, i.e., no bearing at all upon the struggle of a humble individual like myself.⁴

Schiller's early reaction to absolute idealism is indicated again by his connection with the Phasmatological Society. He joined it when he first entered Oxford in 1882. Here he ran down particular ghost stories and thus came to see the relation between thinking and actual experience. By this means he claims that he was saved from enslavement to the traditional logic.⁵

When we turn to the general writings of Dewey and Schiller

porary American Philosophy, ed. by G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1930), II, 16 and 17.

¹Dewey, "Concerning Novelties in Logic: A Reply to Mr. Robinson," Journal of Philosophy, XIV (1917), 245.

²Ibid.

³F. C. S. Schiller, Problems of Belief (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924), p. 58.

⁴Schiller, "Instrumentalism and Idealism," Mind (N.S.), XXXIV (1925), 78.

⁵Schiller, "Some Logical Aspects of Psychical Research," The Case for and Against Psychical Belief, ed. by Carl Murchison (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1927), p. 218.

we find that much space is given to the refutation of absolute idealism. Schiller's Formal Logic is taken up completely with the task of pointing out the weaknesses of the idealistic logics.¹ Dewey in his review of this book is unstinting in his praise of Schiller's skill in refuting the traditional logic.² Schiller's two earliest humanistic volumes, Humanism: Philosophical Essays and Studies in Humanism, are polemics against the absolutism of their day.³ If one turns to their indexes, he finds that such terms and phrases as the following: "absolute," "absolute idea," "absolute mind," "absolutism," "intellectualism," and "rationalism," are referred to more than one hundred and twenty-five times. It is needless to state that when one investigates the material involved in these references, he finds that it is critical and not complimentary. There are also about forty references to Bradley, Bosanquet, and Lotze in the two books. Five of the chapters in the last mentioned of these two books have the term "absolute" in their titles. In four major chapters of Dewey's book, Essays in Experimental Logic, a critique of the epistemology of Lotze's idealism is given.⁴ He brings out his own position in contrast to that of Lotze. Anyone who will take time to look through the indexes of Dewey's philosophical writings will find that the terms and phrases cited above in connection with Schiller's books, or their equivalents, are very much in evidence. This does not mean that the only contribution which these men have made to philosophy is negative and polemical. However, it does mean that the particular type of philosophy which they pioneered was for them, to a large extent, a reaction to idealism. This reactionary character of Schiller's and Dewey's pragmatism has not been so evident in the thought of the other three leaders of the pragmatic movement. Peirce never abandoned objective idealism; and there is reason to believe that he thought

¹Schiller, Formal Logic (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1912).

²Dewey, "A Trenchant Attack on Logic" (A Review of Formal Logic by F. C. S. Schiller), Independent, Vol. LXXIII (1912), p.203.

³Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1903) and Studies in Humanism (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1907).

⁴Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916).

of pragmatism more as a means to an end and that end the furtherance of the cause of an idealistic metaphysics.¹ James certainly never had any love for absolute idealism with its "block universe" and there is much in his writings which can be classed as a critique of the same. Still, it must be remembered that his pragmatism was more an extension of British Empiricism than a reaction to absolute idealism.² Mead's work has not been so polemical as that of James and Schiller and Dewey. He gave his time largely to a detailed development of the theories of science from the point of view of instrumentalism. In this battle in which Schiller and Dewey have been engaged, the former has been more militant or belligerent than the latter, but certainly not any more persistent or convincing.³

Positive Similarities in Humanism and Instrumentalism

Schiller and Dewey have not only agreed in their opposition to certain views, but they have also emphasized some common positive features in their versions of pragmatism. These similarities can best be set before us by first considering some definitions of humanism and instrumentalism. The term "humanism" has been used in many senses, but Schiller has clearly defined its meaning for him in contradistinction to the other meanings which have been applied to it. Humanism for him is described as follows:

The term is here used in a purely epistemological sense. It was adopted by me, with very little philosophic precedent, in the year 1902, to designate a point of view which emphasized the central position of man and of human enterprise in the theory of knowledge.⁴

¹C. W. Morris, "Peirce, Mead, and Pragmatism," The Philosophical Review, XLVII (1938), 112-14.

²Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1931), pp. 22 and 26.

³E. E. Slosson, Six Major Prophets (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1917), p. 230.

⁴Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree? (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935), p. 308, n. 1. In this note Schiller defines his use of the term humanism. In a "Review of Humanism: A New Religion," by C. F. Potter, which appeared in The Personalist, XI (1930), 289 to 290, Schiller differentiates his use of the term humanism, from classical humanism, religious humanism, and neo-classical or modern literary humanism. Much the same ground is covered in one of Schiller's recent articles: "Humanisms and

Schiller also gives an earlier and simpler definition of humanism. It reads as follows:

Humanism is really in itself the simplest of philosophic standpoints; it is merely the perception that the philosophic problem concerns human beings striving to comprehend a world of human experience by the resources of human minds.¹

By the side of these two definitions of humanism let us place two of instrumentalism. The first definition will be a paraphrase of Dewey's words. It reads thus:

Instrumentalism is a logical doctrine. It is the study of reason as it functions in the reconstruction of experience. All logical differentiations and methods are derived from this functioning and have the increased effectiveness of it as their ultimate purpose.²

The second definition is later and somewhat simpler. It is given to us in the following quotation:

I have from time to time set forth a conception of knowledge as being instrumental. Strange meanings have been imputed by critics to this conception. Its actual content is simple: Knowledge is instrumental to the enrichment of immediate experience through the control over action that it exercises.³

According to these definitions humanism and instrumentalism are theories of knowledge of a certain type. They conceive of knowledge as a human activity, achievement or enterprise which functions within man or experience and for the sake of man or experience. If we may be permitted to enlarge upon these definitions and state what they in common imply, we would put it thus: Knowledge must first function in the satisfaction of man's needs, that is, solve his problems, or help him make the proper adjustments; second, it must in doing this be able to meet the test of experience. To put it in another way, humanism and instrumentalism both stress the biological and the empirical aspects of knowledge. We shall now proceed to a discussion of these two aspects.

Humanism" (the first in a series of four articles published posthumously under the general title: "The Personalistic Implications of Humanism"), The Personalist, XVIII (1937), 361-65.

¹Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 12.

²Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, p. 26. See also W. P. Montague, The Ways of Knowing (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925), p. 134.

³Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1934), p. 290.

The Biological Phase of Humanism
and Instrumentalism

Nothing is more significant in humanism and instrumentalism than their biological emphasis. Dewey, in his review of Schiller's book, Humanism: Philosophical Essays, refers to this biological or voluntaristic element as common to Schiller's pragmatism and his own instrumentalism.¹ Early in his career, Schiller referred to the progress of biological knowledge in such a way as to imply its influence upon his thinking.² In his latest book, Must Philosophers Disagree? he has this to say:

That there should be a mind at all, and that the mind should function as it does, becomes intelligible only when we recognize that mind is selective and purposive, through and through. Its so-called "cognitive" operations are just as subservient to its vital purposes, just as biologically useful, as any of its other acts.³

Dewey thinks that there are two main considerations which attracted Schiller to James. The second of these, and the one which was the more definitely philosophical moving force, was the emphasis James placed upon purpose and upon practical ends in determining all intellectual operations.⁴ Here again we have the biological element in humanism called to our attention as an important factor in Schiller's thinking. The biological phase in humanism accounts for a part of the emphasis which Schiller in his writings places on psychology. Logic is psychological, as Schiller would say, and the reason for this is the fact that our thinking is constantly influenced by our emotions and desires.⁵ Logic, as one writer rather extremely states it, is for Schiller a department of psychology.⁶ Schiller himself declares that it

¹Dewey, "Review of Humanism: Philosophical Essays by F. C. S. Schiller," Psychological Bulletin, No. 1 (1904), p. 339.

²Schiller, "Instrumentalism and Idealism," Mind (N.S.), XXXIV (1925), 78.

³Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree? p. 90.

⁴Dewey, "Memorial to F. C. S. Schiller" (Paper read at the Second Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences, New York City, November 28, 1937).

⁵Schiller, Formal Logic, p. 393.

⁶M. E. Clarke, A Study of the Logic of Value (London: University of London Press, 1929), p. 15.

is practically impossible to exaggerate the intimacy which exists between logic and psychology.¹ His writings abound in such statements as follow: "Actual thinking is pervaded and conditioned through and through by psychological processes";² "Processes which are not usually called cognitive, precede, pervade, and clinch every cognitive activity."³

The biological element is also much in evidence in instrumentalism. Dewey writes of the influence that the objective biological approach of the Jamesian psychology had on him.⁴ He first works out this biological approach to philosophy in his famous essay, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology."⁵ This article was published in the nineties of the last century and it gave in a summary fashion the fundamentals of Dewey's instrumentalism. The basic conception for Dewey is that intelligence has become a stage in the organic process, the process of adjustment. It mediates between instinct and habit and its function is practical, conditioned by the needs of the organism. Thinking is no longer just a spectator. It is placed within the evolutionary process and becomes a function of behavior problems. There is no doubt, then, but that the biological contention of the Jamesian psychology as to the essentially active and interested character of the human mind underlies and pervades humanism and instrumentalism.⁶

The Empirical Aspect of Humanism and Instrumentalism

Schiller and Dewey may not agree as to just what experience is, but they certainly concur in the fact that the test for truth must lie within the limits of experience. Knowledge is intraexperiential. The final criterion of the value and signifi-

¹Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 79. ²Ibid., p. 92.

³Schiller, Logic for Use (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 155.

⁴Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," Contemporary American Philosophy, ed. by G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague, II, 25.

⁵Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," The University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy, I (1896), 35-52.

⁶William James, Collected Essays and Reviews, compiled by R. B. Perry (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1920), p. xi.

cance of everything for humanism and instrumentalism is found in experience. Dewey in his review of Schiller's first humanistic volume, Humanism: Philosophical Essays, calls attention to the fact that humanism emphasizes the significance of "experience in its immediate aspects."¹ With enthusiastic approval he then quotes the following statement from Schiller's book: "The only reality we can start with is our own personal, immediate experience. We may lay it down therefore that all immediate experience is as such real, and that no ultimate reality can be reached except from this basis; and upon the stimulation of such immediate experience."² In his Studies in Humanism, Schiller tells us that it is legitimate to assume a series of realities in order to operate on and control the primary reality of experience, provided we do not forget that these assumed realities are dependent upon and interact with immediate experience.³ Later on in the same book he declares that humanism dare not disavow immediate experience.⁴ One of his latest books, Logic for Use, has this to say on the subject:

It is vital to keep the reference to reality immanent in experience and relative to the cognitive process. The real must not be alien to, and outside, the judging. Else we shall relapse into the crux about our thought's correspond-⁵ence with a transcendent, unknowable, metaphysical reality.

There is nothing more evident in Dewey's instrumentalism than its empiricism. In his Studies in Humanism, Schiller lauds the way Dewey in his Studies in Logical Theory refutes the epistemology of absolute idealism and realism. This Dewey does by pointing out the inevitable and unbridgeable gulf (Plato's chasm, as Schiller calls it) between the knower and the transcendent and independent object of knowledge which these theories imply. Then Schiller recommends what Dewey has already offered as a solution to the problem, that is, that we stay comfortably "within the experience process."⁶ One of Dewey's earliest books, The Influence

¹Dewey, "Review of Humanism: Philosophical Essays by F. C. S. Schiller," Psychological Bulletin, No. 1 (1904), p. 338.

²Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays, p. 192.

³Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 222. ⁴Ibid., p. 392.

⁵Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 228.

⁶Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 455.

of Darwin on Philosophy, deals fully with the subject of empiricism. Here are two quotations which set forth his view:

Immediate empiricism postulates that things, anything, everything, in the ordinary or non-technical use of the term "Thing"--are what they are experienced as.¹

Again Dewey says of the principle of immediate empiricism:

But the real significance of the principle is that of a method of philosophical analysis--a method identical in kind (but differing in problem and hence in operation) with that of the scientist. If you wish to find out what subjective, objective, physical, mental, cosmic, psychic, cause, substance, purpose, activity, evil, being, quality--any philosophical term, in short--means, go to experience and see what the thing is experienced as.²

The first chapter of Experience and Nature is devoted specifically to the explanation of the meaning of experience. One significant quotation from this chapter will suffice. It reads as follows:

The value, I say, of the notion of experience for philosophy is that it asserts the finality and comprehensiveness of the method of pointing, finding, showing, and the necessity of seeing what is pointed to and accepting what is found in good faith and without discount.³

The instrumentalism of Dewey certainly could not repudiate its empiricism and still retain its identity as a theory of truth.

The biological and empirical elements of pragmatism are the actual result of Schiller's and Dewey's reactions to absolute idealism. In the first place intelligence is brought down from the far-off transcendent world and placed within the process of evolution. It is no longer fixed and finished and unreachable. It now functions as a product of the process of evolution and for the sake of the same. This epistemological revolution was an inevitable consequence of the mode of thinking introduced by Darwinism, as Dewey indicates by the following words:

In laying hands upon the sacred ark of absolute permanency, in treating the forms that had been treated as types of fixity and perfection as originating and passing away, the "Origin of Species" introduced a mode of thinking that in the end was bound to transform the logic of knowledge. . . .⁴

¹Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1910), p. 227.

²Ibid., p. 239.

³Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1925), p. 11.

⁴Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 2.

In the second place, the test of truth is no longer found in the coherence of ideas in some absolute mind nor in the correspondence of idea with external thing. The truth-process is placed within experience and the test of truth is found in the correspondence of one experience with a successive experience.

The Ethical Phase of Humanism and Instrumentalism

Pragmatism holds that reflective intelligence functions in relation to a particular situation or act and relative to a human personality or organism. It also indicates that intelligence does something in the world, it has a part in reorganizing experience. Here we have stated very briefly what is sometimes called the ethical phase of pragmatism. This ethical factor is undoubtedly found in humanism and instrumentalism, but all that is signified by it is present in or implied by the biological and empirical phases which we have already considered.

The Plan Outlined

We have set forth the common features of humanism and instrumentalism in this chapter. In the remaining chapters of this thesis we shall consider not only the differences between these two pragmatic theories of truth but also the divergencies which exist in the whole field of the philosophies of Dewey and Schiller. Our plan will be as follows: First we shall discuss their psychologies, second their theories of truth, third their theories of value, fourth their metaphysical and religious points of view, and fifth and last we shall give a summary of the dissimilarities and present an explanation of the same.

CHAPTER II

TWO PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEWPOINTS

The Significance of Psychology

Dewey and Schiller agree in emphasizing the importance of psychology. They both feel that the type of psychology which they choose is basic in relation to their theories of truth. For instance, in the Prefatory Note to his Essays in Experimental Logic, Dewey asserts that the psychological basis for his logic is behavioristic.¹ Later on in the book he declares that

instrumentalism means a behaviorist theory of thinking and knowing. It means that knowing is literally something which we do; that analysis is ultimately physical and active; that meanings in their logical quality are standpoints, attitudes, and methods of behaving toward facts, and that active experimentation is essential to verification. Put in another way it holds that thinking does not mean any transcendent states or acts suddenly introduced into a previously natural scene, but that the operations of knowing are (or are artfully derived from) natural responses of the organism, which constitute knowing in virtue of the situation of doubt in which they arise and in virtue of the uses of inquiry, reconstruction, and control to which they are put.²

It seems to me that Dewey clearly implies in these statements that we could not have an instrumental theory of truth such as his without a behavioristic psychology upon which to base it. Professor H. C. Brown saw that instrumentalism is dependent upon a behavioristic psychology and he expressed this fact thus in his review of Dewey's Essays in Experimental Logic:

What Professor Dewey's critics need to dwell upon is his psychology, the psychology of behaviorism. With this psychology his thought stands or falls. If we once grant that sensations "are not elements out of which perceptions are composed, constituted, or constructed," but that "they are the finest, most carefully discriminated objects of perception" the rest follows inevitably as we read on in the language of facts. On this basis the puzzles of subjectivism are gone, for while we have the individualism that is the result of differently constructed organisms responding differ-

¹Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 6.

²Ibid., p. 331.

ently to the same external situations, there is no more mystery, privacy, or subjectivity in the fact than in the case where different makes of golf-balls respond differently to similar strikes.¹

On the other hand, Schiller declares that we must be careful to choose a voluntarist or activist psychology and not "a behaviorism which sets itself to ignore the conscious side of intelligent action."² No doubt Schiller, in this connection, refers to Watsonian behaviorism. However, we shall discover later on in this paper that his emphasis upon personality, the psychical character of mental events, and introspection would also exclude Dewey's broader type of behaviorism. All of this means, then, that Schiller feels that he must have the traditional type of psychology upon which to base his humanistic theory of truth.

Two Concepts of Mind

For Dewey a mental event is a natural event which symbolizes the future in such a way as to influence present behavior.³ In other words, mentality means "the function of indicating other events," or speaking behavioristically, "the ability to anticipate future consequences and to respond to them as stimuli to present behavior."⁴ This view of the symbolic nature of mind is for the instrumentalist the more important phase of pragmatism. The foundations of it were laid by Peirce. Schiller nowhere gives us anything like this symbolic theory of mind. In fact, he nowhere analyzes the term "mind" although he often uses it. Judging from his use of such terms as "mind," "reflection," "reason," and "intelligence" we are convinced that he thinks of mind, in man at least, as the sum of the psychical activities of a personality. At one place he speaks of will, feeling, and thought,

¹H. C. Brown, "A Review of Essays in Experimental Logic by John Dewey," Journal of Philosophy, XIV (1917), 246.

²Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 38. See also Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree? p. 265, and F. C. S. Schiller, "Humanisms and Humanism" (the first article in a series under the general title: "The Personalistic Implications of Humanism"), The Personalist, XVIII (1937), 361-65.

³Morris, Six Theories of Mind (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 276. See also Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 226, 228 and Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 350.

⁴Ibid., p. 296.

for him the general mental characteristics, as the activities of a unitary personality.¹

Two Concepts of the Self

Closely allied to Dewey's concept of mind is his concept of the self. The self for Dewey is an organism which has acquired the quality of mentality.² Mentality is a characteristic of the organism in relation to its environment. Mentality is in the environment, and yet when the organism has taken it on the organism becomes a self. This view excludes the notion of the self or soul or personality in the traditional sense of these terms. Dewey recognizes this when he states that "according to the 'Chicago School,' the personal is not ultimate, but it is to be analyzed and defined, biologically on its genetic side, ethically on its prospective and functioning side."³

Personality as ultimate and unanalyzable, the metaphysically real, is Schiller's most important concept.⁴ In his first book, The Riddles of the Sphinx, he writes thus of personality: "As the most certain of all things, it is the Alpha, the starting-point, and it would not be surprising if it turned out also the Omega, the goal of philosophy."⁵ In Studies in Humanism he tells us that

the people who decline to admit the existence of personality until it has been abstractly defined to their liking are beyond the pale of ordinary scientific argument.⁶

Merrington has the following to say of Schiller's views of personality:

He is therefore hopeful that the assumption of his own existence may perhaps prove more valuable than any of the denials of the Self that are propounded by "psychologies which neglect the proper problem in their anxiety to be ranked among the natural sciences."⁷

¹Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 129.

²Morris, Six Theories of Mind, p. 329.

³Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 325. ⁴Ibid.

⁵Schiller, The Riddles of the Sphinx (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1891), p. 141.

⁶Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 381.

⁷E. H. Merrington, The Problem of Personality (London:

In one of his latest books, Logic for Use, after asserting that James in his chain conception of the self failed "to elucidate the unity of the I and the Me," Schiller states that for him "the I and the Me are one, consubstantial, share in the same contents, and are together the soul."¹ In 1924, in an essay on the relation between psychology and logic, he championed the cause of soul psychology as over against the other psychological schools of the day.² He also acknowledged his close relation to William McDougall, who has consistently contended for the existence of the soul. We can easily see that Dewey's theory of the symbolic nature of mind would not fit into Schiller's scheme--a mind which is the sum of the psychical activities of a personality that is ultimate, unanalyzable, and metaphysical.

The Origin of Mind and the Self

Dewey, influenced in part at least by Mead, has given us a theory as to the origin of the mind and the self. They are both social emergents. Mind evolved in connection with language-communication, with the development of the significant symbol. The organism arrives at the place where it can react to its own gesture as others would. Thus the future enters into and controls the present, and such a functioning is mind. The self arises for Mead and Dewey in the same way that the mind does, that is, by means of the phenomena of role-taking and this role-taking is made possible by the phenomena of the significant symbol or language-communication.³ Schiller has no theory as to the origin of the self and mind. He falls back on the notion that they must have always existed.⁴

The Macmillan Co., 1916), p. 105. See also Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays, p. 53.

¹Schiller, Logic for Use, pp. 377 and 378.

²Schiller, "Psychology and Logic," Psychology and the Sciences, ed. by William Brown (London: A and C Black Ltd., 1924), pp. 53-70.

³Dewey, "The Need for Social Psychology," Psychological Review, XXIV (1917), 276. See also G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, ed. with introduction by C. W. Morris (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 14.

⁴Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree? p. 265.

What biological purpose does the mind serve according to Schiller and Dewey? For Schiller mind means a greatly increased ability to make adjustments.¹ This is as far as he goes in analyzing the evolutionary significance of the mind. Dewey takes the same general position but he works it out in a more detailed way. Mind arose in order to meet and solve problematic situations. The smooth ongoing of the interactions of the organism and the environment were thwarted. Mind came on the scene to assist in making unhindered interaction possible again. Thus Dewey's notion of the self and the mind has both a genetic and a prospective phase, while Schiller's view of the self and the mind has only a prospective phase. It may also be added that this prospective phase is not as fully developed with him as it is with Dewey.

Behaviorism versus Introspection

Earlier in this discussion we noted the fact that Dewey insisted on a behavioristic psychology as essential to instrumentalism. We must now consider this behaviorism in more detail.

First of all, it signifies that all psychological data, those of conscious behavior as well as those of the lower types, are to be objectively observed and not introspected. "Consciousness" as a noun which represents a peculiar kind of existence, a psychical something over against that which is physical, is abandoned by Dewey, but "consciousness" as an adjective which describes a certain type of behavior is retained.² In accordance with all of this, Dewey insists on the right still to use such qualitative terms as "sensing," "perceiving," "conceiving," "loving" and "admiring." Thus he redefines and retains the older terminology which Watson completely rejects. This terminology refers to a class of acts which is different from the class of acts to which locomotion or digestion belongs.³ These acts of the former class have "traits that enable one to discriminate and identify them as 'special modes of behavior.'"⁴ Behavior is quali-

¹Ibid. ²Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, p. 314.

³Dewey, "Conduct and Experience," Psychologies of 1930, ed. by Carl Murchison (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1927), pp. 417-21.

⁴Ibid., p. 414.

tative, conscious, purposive, meaningful, or mental not because of what it is but rather because of what it does.

Watsonism oversimplifies the process of behaviorism, makes it piece-meal and mechanical, the relation of a stimulus to a response. It "gives the impression of regarding the organism as a puppet, whose wires are pulled by the physical environment."¹ It interprets the higher forms of behavior in terms of the lower and thus empties them of their real significance. Conscious behavior is much more complex than Watsonism permits it to be. It is, for Dewey, not just a function of the organism, but an interaction, a product of both the organism and the environment. "Behavior in fact is a continuous interaction in which environing as well as organic factors are included. This is true even of the functions we often regard as exclusively physiological."² Breathing, for example, is a matter of both the lungs and the air, the organism and the environment. The same is true of all cases of behavior. The reality is the interaction, the behavior, and organism and environment are abstractions from this totality.³ Organism and environment are correlatives or cooperatives in this whole.⁴ The stimulus in the environment does not initiate the activity of the organism, it only changes or directs it.⁵ The organism is naturally active from the first. It selects a given stimulus from an environment that is full of possible stimuli and this selection is made on the basis of what the organism is and has been. This makes behavior from the standpoint of the organism "longitudinal or biographical."⁶ The best illustration of Dewey's interactive conception of behavior is language-communication and this is described as

¹Mead, Mind, Self and Society, ed. with introduction by C. W. Morris (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. xviii.

²Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, p. 311.

³Dewey, "Conduct and Experience," Psychologies of 1930, ed. by Carl Murchison, p. 411.

⁴Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 17. See also Joseph Ratner, The Philosophy of John Dewey (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1929), p. 60.

⁵Dewey, "Conduct and Experience," Psychologies of 1930, ed. by Carl Murchison, p. 413.

⁶Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, p. 308.

the establishment of cooperation in an activity in which there are partners, and in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership. . . . Meaning is not indeed a psychic existence; it is primarily a property of objects. But the behavior of which it is a quality is a distinctive behavior; cooperative, in that response to another's act involves contemporaneous response to a thing as entering into the other's behavior, and this upon both sides.¹

A corollary of Dewey's behaviorism is his opposition to the idea of subjectivity and monopolistic possession.² This erroneous notion goes with self-psychology, a type of psychology which Dewey has abandoned. Subjectivism in this sense must be exorcised. An event remains objective even when the psychological factor is introduced. When personal dispositions and attitudes come in they do not make events subjective, they only condition their occurrence. The discovery of the part that they thus play only helps us better to regulate events.

Knowledge of the organic conditions (dispositions and attitudes) of experienced objects renders us exactly the same sort of intellectual and practical service as knowledge of physical constants or extra-organic conditions.³

These mental conditions may be studied as concrete intellectual objects, but they have no actual existence nor significance "except as ways of seeking, turning from, appropriating, treating things."⁴ They are only links in an ongoing and objective process. Intelligence is a natural interaction and the secondary and tertiary qualities are qualities of natural objects.⁵ Or to put it another way: "The so-called action of 'consciousness' means simply the organic releases in the way of behavior which are the conditions of awareness, and which modify its contents."⁶ Until within recent years relativity for philosophy and psychology has meant subjectivity, but in Dewey's thought we have relativity combined with objectivity. "The world is a different world to each individual. That does not mean that the consciousness inside of me is different from yours, but that the universe from my point of view is different than it is from your point of view."⁷ The pri-

¹Ratner, The Philosophy of John Dewey, p. 60.

²Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 234.

³Ibid., p. 238.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 239.

⁶Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, p. 47.

⁷Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1936), p. 416.

vate is a matter of viewpoint and not of subjectivity or monopolistic possession.

We have already noted that Schiller rejects Watsonism and that his general psychological position excludes even the broader behaviorism of Dewey.¹ This means that introspection rather than objective observation is the most important method of psychology. It also prepares the way for Schiller's emphasis upon subjective relativism which is always and everywhere antithetical to Dewey's objective relativism. The following passages express this intensified notion of subjectivity:

The individual soul which science seemed to abstract from and philosophy despised, is after all the ultimate principle of unity and order, because it is the only available agency of selection. It stands at the core and center of the cosmos and occupies the sole point at which all the various sorts of reality intersect, the sole position from which they can be controlled and unified.²

In the same connection he declares that the central position of the individual soul

fully warrants a resolute refusal on our part to neglect the significance of the realities we have called "subjective." They certainly lie very near the center of affairs, and no limit can be set to their influence: they pervade, and, if you will have it so, taint, all our "truths."³

Pratt describes this subjectivity in a striking way when he calls attention to the stress which the pragmatists (especially Schiller) place upon the fact that science is the product of "the answers that Nature gives to our questions, that the kind of questions asked determines the kind of answer given, and that we have to ask the questions."⁴

Social versus Individualistic Psychology

As we have already indicated Dewey, like Mead, makes psychology basically social. Dewey's behaviorism is social. Mind and the self are social emergents.⁵ Individual psychology is an

¹Supra, p.12.

²Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree? p. 349.

³Ibid., p. 350.

⁴J. B. Pratt, Personal Realism (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937), p. 95.

⁵Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 14. See also Dewey, "The Need for Social Psychology," Psychological Review, XXIV (1917), 276.

abstraction from social psychology. Baum is correct when he states that Dewey consistently argues that there is no such thing as individual psychology per se.¹ The individual is the product of an interaction between an organism and its environment and this environment is of course pre-eminently social.

Schiller's psychology is individualistic rather than social. Everything is relative to the individual. There is seldom a suggestion of social psychology. At best it is only a secondary science. He is in agreement with James at this point. Of the latter Baum writes that he found no "recognition of the need and value of a social psychology"² after searching through more than three hundred of James's many and varied writings. Schiller's idea of the self and the mind as well as his insistence upon the introspective method is in harmony with his neglect of social psychology.

Schiller Follows the Subjective and Dewey the Objective Strain in James's Psychology

It is now clearly evident that Schiller follows the subjective strain in James's psychology and Dewey the objective. Dewey writes of this double strain and of his allegiance to the objective tendency. He credits James with influencing his thinking through his Psychology rather than through what are usually considered his specific writings on philosophy, and then offers the following explanation:

For there are, I think, two unreconciled strains in the Psychology. One is found in the adoption of the subjective tenor of prior psychological tradition; even when the special tenets of that tradition are radically criticized, an underlying subjectivism is retained, at least in vocabulary. . . . Nevertheless, the point of view remained that of a realm of consciousness set off by itself. The other strain is objective, having its roots in a return to the earlier biological conception of psyche, but a return possessed of a new force and value due to the immense progress made by biology since the time of Aristotle.³

It is the last tendency that is so significant and that has worked

¹W. M. Baum, "A Comparative Study of the Philosophies of William James and John Dewey" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago, 1928), p. 38.

²Ibid.

³Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," Contemporary American Philosophy, II, 23.

its way into all of Dewey's ideas "and acted as a ferment to transform old beliefs."¹

Some Further Psychological Concepts

The objectivity of Dewey's psychology and the subjectivity of Schiller's, both of which have been so evident in our study thus far, are further illustrated by their definition of certain other psychological concepts. Both men choose "attitudes" as the term which best describes mental activities, but Dewey gives it an objective and Schiller a subjective meaning. For the former an attitude is a function of objective things,² while for the latter it "is always a subjective-addition to the 'facts of the case.'"³ Interest for Dewey is an organic bias which may be conscious or unconscious.⁴ On the other hand, Schiller follows James in making it a conscious, subjective basis of selection.⁵ To think, for Dewey, is to "act on the basis of the absent and the future,"⁶ and this act is overt, public, behavioristic, and physical. His writings abound in assertions which substantiate this interpretation.⁷ For Schiller, thinking is a personal act which is psychical and subjective. It leads to judgment (a making up of our minds, or decision), and judgment, a personal act itself--something psychical and subjective--is the connecting link between thought and overt activity or behavior.⁸ Thus we see that thinking for Schiller is anything but overt, public, be-

¹Ibid., p. 24. ²Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 390.

³Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 39.

⁴Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 95.

⁵Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree? p. 90.

⁶Dewey, How We Think (New York: D. C. Heath and Co., 1910), p. 14.

⁷Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 14 and 331. See also Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp. 379 and 221, and Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1929), pp. 166 and 227.

⁸Schiller, Logic for Use, pp. 94, 198-204. See also Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree? p. 53; Eleanor Bisbee, "A Review of Logic for Use by F. C. S. Schiller," The Journal of Philosophy, XXVII (1930), 441; Schiller, "Ethics, Casuistry and Life" (the third article in a series under the general title: "The Personalistic Implications of Humanism"), The Personalist, XIX (1938), 168 and 169.

havioristic, or physical. Choice, for Dewey, is primarily "a piece of behavior on the part of a particular thing,"¹ while for Schiller it is "personal and 'subjective.'"² We might continue this portion of our study with such concepts as will, purpose, desire; and we would find Dewey making them behavioristic, objective, social, and Schiller describing them as psychical, subjective, and individualistic. Schiller sanctions the momentous discovery which he says was made years ago "that we all have our individual ways of perceiving and feeling and thinking and, in general, of taking our experience, and are, in consequence, each at the center of a universe of our own."³ Join this with his statement that the aim of psychology is to describe "all psychic facts and processes," and one obtains an excellent conception of his general viewpoint in psychology.⁴ Compare these quotations with some from Dewey as to the general character of psychology; three such quotations will suffice, and they are as follows: "Identifying modes of individual experiencing with modes of behavior identified objectively and objectively analyzable makes a science of psychology possible";⁵ "the problem of social psychology . . . is how different customs, established interacting arrangements, form and nurture different minds";⁶ these two are united in a third which asserts "that the mental, like the physical and organic, operates as an included factor within social phenomena."⁷ These statements as to the general character of Schiller's and Dewey's psychology substantiate the antitheses which exist between them as they have already been outlined.

¹Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 364.

²Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 41.

³Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree? p. 159.

⁴Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 33.

⁵Dewey, "Conduct and Experience," Psychologies of 1930, ed. by Carl Murchison, p. 418.

⁶Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 63.

⁷Arthur F. Bentley, Behavior Knowledge, Fact (Bloomington: The Principia Press, Inc., 1935), pp. 6 and 7.

Schiller Retains but Dewey Rejects Idealism in Psychology

Let us note in connection with these antithetical viewpoints in psychology which are characteristic of Dewey and Schiller that these two men started out with similar psychologies. Their psychological positions at first were idealistic. Schiller has never moved away from his former position so far as his psychology is concerned. This is confirmed not only by our present study but also by the fact that there is much in common between his psychological position today and that of Dewey back in the eighties of the last century.¹ Dewey was a loyal idealist then. Today the situation has changed with respect to Dewey. As we have already seen, he has forsaken the idealistic psychology which he once advocated.

The Determining Factor in the Two Psychologies

Now we have the two psychologies before us. What is the determining factor in each? Undoubtedly the determining factor for Schiller is personality, personality that is unanalyzable and ultimate. He starts out with that which is unexplainable, that which is unique, given, transcendental, mystical, or supernatural. To this extent he forsakes a thoroughgoing empiricism and involves himself in a trend which will inevitably lead to more ultimates or noumena. Personality is not explained, and the same is true of mind. He has no theory as to the origin of mind and the self; he just accepts the fact of their existence. Here he forsakes Darwinism, a theory which he talks much about but does not really follow. Introspective psychology is unavoidable when experience is locked up in an unanalyzable personality. Individualism, subjectivism, monopolistic possession and privacy follow in the wake of such a position. This sort of emphasis makes it impossible for social psychology to be primary. In such a scheme it can at best only occupy a very subordinate place. Starting as he did with a personality that is unanalyzable and ultimate he could not consistently follow anything but the subjective strain

¹Dewey, "The Psychological Standpoint," *Mind*, XI (1886), 2 and 8. See also Dewey, "Psychology as Philosophic Method," *Mind*, XI (1886), 157.

in James's psychology. Thus it seems that Schiller, who spent his life fighting against the Absolute, started out with an absolute or ultimate and thereby opened the way for other absolutes. We shall find that he adopted the unique or super-empirical into his philosophical family on more than one occasion.

Dewey holds that personality is analyzable and not ultimate. This does not exactly mean that the key to Dewey's position is the fact that personality is analyzable. It does however give us a clue to what we may expect in his thought. It indicates that he is not going to have any place for absolutes. He is consistently against all noumenal or transcendental reals. His purpose is to explain everything and to do it in terms of the process which is going on in nature. This means that he is an empirical evolutionist or an evolutionary naturalist, a full-fledged Darwinian. In other words, instrumentalism is, in part at least, the application of Darwinism to philosophy. Dewey referred to a psychology which had been radically revolutionized by Darwin when he declared that the objective, biological tendency in James's psychology worked its way into all of his ideas "and acted as a ferment to transform old beliefs."¹ This Darwinian method of explanation is in evidence throughout his psychology. The self and mind are explained in terms of their place in the process of evolution. They evolved in order to meet a certain situation in the environment, that is, they were natural selections, and are thus a part of nature. The environment out of which mind and the self emerged was social and objective or behavioristic. This does not mean that the self and mind are merely mechanical. They are just what they are, and nature is enlarged as it were to take in whatever qualities or characteristics appear there in the process of evolution. When we reach the level of mind, evolution becomes conscious, free, controlled. The high and noble task of philosophy is to point out, describe, elaborate, and foster this type of evolution. Since this process goes on in a social medium, social psychology is primary and individual psychology is secondary, an abstraction from the former. Dewey's instrumentalism, then, from the first has been opposed to all over-beliefs, absolutes--that which is super-empirical, fixed

¹Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," Contemporary American Philosophy, II, 24.

or finished, and he has adopted a psychology which provides a foundation for such opposition. We shall find that he has tried to follow this anti-supernatural ideal through all of his philosophy and I believe that we shall have to admit that he has been successful. He does not permit that which is fundamentally against his empirical naturalism to slip in and become a part of his philosophy.

CHAPTER III

TWO THEORIES OF TRUTH

Pragmatism is a Theory of Truth

Pragmatism is a theory of truth. James, in his famous definition of pragmatism, said that it was first a method and second "a genetic theory of what is meant by truth."¹ The nature of the test of truth is pragmatism's problem.

In the first chapter we discussed the common features which are involved in Dewey's and Schiller's tests of truth. In this chapter we are to consider the contrasts which exist between their theories of truth. The features which were pointed out as common in the first chapter will in most cases now be seen to be the source of the significant differences. This does not undo what we did there; it only means that Dewey and Schiller have developed these common phases in different directions or else one of them has elaborated some of them in more detail than the other.

We must also remember that the two psychologies presented in the second chapter set the limit for the theories of truth which we are to consider. One could not interchange the psychological foundations and yet have the same theories of truth. The fact that one psychological viewpoint is behavioristic and social and the other is not will make a decided difference in the theories of truth which are built upon them.

Little work has been done in the past in specifically comparing the thought of Dewey and Schiller. There is nothing of the kind which deals in any adequate way with their common features. The same is true with regard to their psychological differences. There has been, however, some previous consideration of the dissimilarities which exist between their theories of truth. It is with a brief review of these that we shall begin our discussion in this chapter.

¹William James, Pragmatism (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), p. 64.

Previous Discussions of the Contrasts Between
Instrumentalism and Humanism

Dewey, in his essay, "What Pragmatism Means by Practical," asserts that an idea is true in so far as it executes the procedure or action which it sketches or intends.¹ He also states that James certainly means this at times, but on other occasions he leaves the way open for an idea to be true in so far as it itself is satisfactory. This means that anything which is agreeable, good in any way, is true. Thus the criterion of truth becomes personal and subjective.

This difference between Dewey and James can be brought out more clearly if we connect it with Professor C. W. Morris's comparison of Dewey's and James's tests of truth. It is perfectly legitimate for us to do this since Professor Morris's material has been approved by Dewey. According to Professor Morris, an idea to be true must, on Dewey's account, be a means of adjustment, and that which is achieved in the way of adjustment must have been intended. Thus "successful working" and "verified prediction" are united in Dewey's theory of truth.² This analysis follows Dewey's psychology of mind. Ideas are first instruments by means of which the organism adjusts itself to its environment, and second, ideas are the "promise of things hoped for and the symbol of things not seen."³

According to Professor Morris, James's test of truth has both of these elements in-it, that is, successful working and verified prediction, but James does not develop either of them as definitely or fully as Dewey, or see clearly their interrelation.⁴

Schiller talks about prediction, and no doubt occasionally he has in mind "verified prediction," but he does not insist on it as an essential factor in his theory of truth.⁵ This ac-

¹Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, chap. xii.

²Morris, Six Theories of Mind, p. 307. See also Morris, "The Prediction Theory of Truth," Monist, XXXVIII (1928), 386-401; Morris, "Neo-Pragmatism and the Ways of Knowing," Monist, XXXVIII (1928), 494-510; Morris, "Truth, Action and Verification," Monist, XLII (1932), 321-29; and Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1920), p. 159.

³Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 350.

⁴Morris, Six Theories of Truth, p. 290.

⁵Schiller, Logic for Use, pp. 285, 95, 97, and 159.

cords with the fact that he has no symbolic theory of mind. On the other hand, Schiller does emphasize successful working. He is an instrumentalist. However, following James, he does not supply any "detailed account of the relation of mental processes to the demands of action."¹

Professor E. A. Burt, in his paper, "Two Basic Issues in the Problem of Meaning and Truth," points out in substance that Dewey's pragmatism is social and objective, while that of James is individualistic and subjective.² Schiller disagrees with Professor Burt. For him there is no necessary conflict between an individualistic and a social theory of truth. The first type of theory can and will naturally be developed into the second. It is natural for human beings to work with their individual meanings until they arrive at common meanings or truths, because social meanings are more satisfactory to the normal man than individual meanings. Besides, universality and objectivity are not to be attained merely by an insistence upon the unity of scientific method. Bias is a source of error in scientific investigations as well as in other cognitive enterprises, and can only be eliminated gradually.³

Positively, Schiller here defends the subjectivity and individualism of truth as he and James believe in it. Negatively, he denies the possibility of absolute universality and objectivity even in scientific inquiry. In this it seems to me that he and James vitally disagree with Dewey, even though Schiller holds that they do not.

Professor Morris, in his review of Schiller's last book, Must Philosophers Disagree? states that Peirce, Dewey, and Mead stress the social element in experience, meaning, and knowledge and also that this characteristic of the thought of these men has found little response in Schiller's world of ideas.⁴ The

¹Morris, Six Theories of Truth, p. 290.

²E. A. Burt, "Two Basic Issues in the Problem of Meaning and of Truth," Essays in Honor of John Dewey (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1929), pp. 73-77.

³Schiller, "A Review of Essays in Honor of John Dewey," Mind (N. S.), XXXIX (1930), 484-88.

⁴Morris, "A Review of Must Philosophers Disagree? by F. C. S. Schiller," Personalist, XVI (1935), 389. See also R. B. Perry, "Realism and Pragmatism," Mind (N. S.), XXII (1913) 547.

latter is even charged with being "obsessed with the personal and the subjective." Schiller answers Professor Morris about as he answered Professor Burt: Individual meanings do not satisfy.¹ Man is a social being and sooner or later must have the sanction of his fellows on that which he believes to be true. Therefore, he claims that his theory is essentially the same as that of Dewey; it is social in character. Here, again, I disagree with Schiller. I believe that there is a vital difference between Schiller's and Dewey's theories of truth.

Professor S. P. Lamprecht, in his review of Schiller's book, Problems of Belief, states that its big lack is its failure to consider the nature of evidence.² His final judgment on the book is expressed thus:

Dr. Schiller like William James has a keen sense for the confusion in most human thinking of psychological motivations and logical requirements; but unlike Professor Dewey he has not developed a logic of experimental inquiry for finding pertinent evidence. One would not be overstating the contrast between humanism and American instrumentalism if one said that humanism was an arrested pragmatism which had a clear theory of the origin³ of human beliefs, but no critical theory of evidence at all.

Professor L. J. Russell criticizes Schiller's Logic for Use about as Lamprecht criticizes Problems of Belief. According to Russell, Logic for Use does not formulate in any systematic way any provisional canons of investigation.⁴

Some Logical Concepts

The subjectivism which has been ascribed to Schiller's humanism as over against the objectivism of Dewey's instrumentalism is evident in the explanations which these two men give of the concepts of logic. Take the concept of meaning for instance. It "is by far the most fundamental of the 'presuppositions' of the theory of knowledge," according to Schiller.⁵ Truth which is

¹Schiller, "Must Philosophers Disagree? Personalist, XVII (1936), 56.

²S. P. Lamprecht, "A Review of Problems of Belief by F. C. S. Schiller," The Journal of Philosophy, XXII (1925), 275.

³Ibid., p. 278.

⁴L. J. Russell, "A Review of Logic for Use by F. C. S. Schiller," Mind (N. S.), XXXIX (1930), 218.

⁵Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 53.

useful and works is indissolubly bound up with meaning.

In point of fact the usefulness and efficiency of truth are merely corollaries from the recognition of personal meaning. For once we admit that every truth must arise from a search for truth, in a context of personal endeavor, it must be related to the purposes of the truth-seeker and seem valuable and useful to him. So soon as we drop the abstraction from the personal context of the actual judgment which Formal Logic makes, we make it clear that meaning depends on application; and application is simply logical use. All truth, therefore, must have a use, because it must have a meaning.¹

These two references confirm Dewey's recent statement as to Schiller. He declared that Schiller "was a pioneer in insisting upon the central place of meaning and its primacy over the conception of truth."²

Schiller explains the nature of this all-important concept of meaning thus:

Initially meaning is nothing "objective," though it comes to be ascribed to "objects"; it is neither a thing nor a relation between things. It is nothing that the world can be conceived as continuing to possess, if all minds had been eliminated from it. It is, therefore, in this sense, and so far, subjective.³

He further states that it is an experience which is not best described as a "mental process" because it is not merely a happening in the mind. It "is rather a reaction of the mind upon the course of events, and an attitude taken up towards potential objects of thought which are transfigured when meaning is attributed to them."⁴

Meaning, then, is foundational for Schiller's theory of truth. Along with this it is subjective and cognitive and as such inevitably places the stamp of subjectivity upon Schiller's theory of truth. A true interpretation of humanism could not make it otherwise than subjective.

Meaning is also a very important concept for Dewey. It is co-extensive with mind and as such it is wider in scope than truth. Truth belongs only to the class of meanings "in which a claim to verifiability by their consequences is an intrinsic part of their meaning."⁵ Further, meanings are objective, modes of

¹Ibid., p. 158.

²Dewey, "Memorial to F. C. S. Schiller."

³Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 64.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ratner, The Philosophy of John Dewey, p. 544.

natural reaction, for Dewey.¹ This objectivity of meaning is illustrated by a policeman who directs traffic by the blowing of a whistle. This act embodies a rule of action.

Its proximate meaning is its nearby consequences in coordination of movements of persons and vehicles; its ulterior and permanent meaning--essence--is its consequence in the way of security of social movement. Failure to observe the signal subjects a person to arrest, fine or imprisonment. The essence embodied in the policeman's whistle is not an occult reality superimposed upon a sensuous or physical flux and imparting form to it; a mysterious subsistence somehow housed within a psychical event. Its essence is the rule, comprehensive and persisting, the standardized habit, of social interaction, and for the sake of which the whistle is used.²

Meaning for Dewey, then, is non-cognitive and objective in contrast to its cognitive and subjective character for Schiller. A truth which is thus based on a meaning that is objective must be objective itself.

There are three other concepts which are very significant for all pragmatic or relativistic theories of truth. They are the concepts of context, relevance and purpose. Dewey has recently declared that Schiller's emphasis upon these concepts is as much needed today as ever.³ Dewey, however, rejects the dominantly psychological interpretation which Schiller gives to these categories. In other words, he is not in accord with the subjectivistic or mentalistic strain in Schiller's humanism. In a letter to the writer he says: "Incidentally, I would state that I think it is entirely possible to give purely objective statements of the categories of purpose and context instead of the mental one."

The Individualistic versus the Social

Subjectivism and individualism go together in Schiller's theory of truth. One implies the other. In contrast to this, the objectivism of Dewey's view lays the foundation for his social emphasis. The difference between the two theories at this point may be set forth in connection with their diverse conceptions of science. Both men speak of knowing as an experiment and of the scientific method as the only pathway to knowledge.⁴ Truth-

¹Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp. 190, 288.

²Ibid. ³Dewey, "Memorial to F. C. S. Schiller."

⁴Schiller, Logic for Use, pp. 386, 286.

claims or ideas are hypotheses which are to be tested or verified. The process of verification is unending and never arrives at final or absolute truth.¹ Truth at its best will always be tentative. Thus far we have agreement between Dewey and Schiller. From here on there is disagreement. Schiller refuses to make a definite line of demarcation between observation, which he defines as active watchfulness, and experiment as a laboratory activity. He does not limit experiment and the scientific method to the laboratory.² Dewey, on the other hand, at least tends to identify experiment and the scientific method with the laboratory method--that which deals with the realm of "physical knowledge," that which "can be reported and repeated."³ Thus truth can be both scientific or experimental and individualistic for Schiller, while for Dewey it must be objective and social if scientific.

Earlier in this chapter the fact is recorded that Schiller claimed that his theory of truth was social in character.⁴ He argued thus: It is natural for the satisfied individual to give up his satisfaction if his fellows do not accept it. Thus the truth as that which is satisfactory ceases to be if it does not become a group affair. Such a process as this, however, does not give us a theory of truth which is objective and social, for two reasons. In the first place, the satisfaction of one's fellows is secondary and not primary. It follows the individual's satisfaction. Secondly, the satisfaction of the individual and the satisfaction of his fellows would be defined by Schiller as a subjective or psychical experience. As subjective it could not be objective and social.

Religious Truth versus Scientific Truth

Schiller's test of truth is certainly not specific. As he himself declares, "working" and "consequences" are indefinite and vary with the subject-matter and problems.⁵ Take religion and science for instance. The data of the former are inward,

¹Ibid., p. 320.

²Ibid., pp. 388, 389.

³Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 84, 107 and 250. See also Arthur F. Bentley, Behavior Knowledge, Fact (Bloomington: The Principia Press, 1935), pp. 6 and 7.

⁴Supra, pp. 27 and 28.

⁵Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 170.

personal, and spiritual, while those of science are objective. Religion takes account of the emotions of souls and spiritual results, while science gives heed to the motions of bodies and material results.¹ In the latter case the relevant working appeals to the senses, while the former appeals to a perception of spiritual value, and perhaps to a certain incommunicable and apparently self-validating experiences called "mystical."² Science, however, has no advantage over religion because its data are objective. Both religion and science are relative and must take account of the personal equation. Divergencies of taste are universal and ultimate. The so-called differences of opinion reign in every domain of thought from esthetics to logic, and as one critic says, there is for Schiller no "objective truth at all."³ Even the real seems always to be indeterminate toward such final questions as optimism versus pessimism, chance versus design, and free will versus determinism.

Thus ultimately truth is Janus-faced; the only ultimate truth is the necessity of choice between two alternatives. And seeing that ex hypothesi both interpretations may be complete and able to account for all of the facts, choice between the alternatives must be left to us by the "objective" nature of things. In other words, it must be "subjective"--that is, a human act.⁴

Thus the real is non-committal. It may be and actually appears to be intrinsically neutral so that it will fit with amiable passivity into different interpretations.

Dewey's position is very different. In his test he follows the method of experimental science. This method according to him deals only with observable data and is the typical form of knowing. It should be made universal as soon as possible, that is, it should be applied even to religion as well as to all other social and humane subjects.⁵ This attitude is suggested by the following significant quotation:

¹Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree? p. 316.

²Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 170.

³Russell, "A Review of Logic for Use by F. C. S. Schiller," Mind (N.S.), XXXIX (1930), 218.

⁴Schiller, Problems of Belief, p. 184.

⁵See Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 78, 107, 123, 138, 169, and Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 193.

Indulge for a moment in an imaginative flight. Suppose that men had been systematically educated to believe that the important thing is not to get themselves personally "right" in relation to the antecedent author of these values, but to form judgments and to carry on their activity on the basis of public, objective, shared consequences. Imagine these things and then imagine what the present situation might be.¹

This quotation gives us a glimpse of the purpose of The Quest for Certainty. Here Dewey contends for the substitution of the quest for security by scientific methods for the quest for certainty as carried on by traditional religion and traditional philosophy.² Dewey admits, however, that this central task of philosophy is far from being realized at present.³ What is the significance of all of this for Dewey's theory of truth? It means that all realms of human knowledge have objective data, data which can be pointed to by all. The data can be tested by a theory which applies the scientific method and the result will be truth that is objective and social.

Two Concepts of Experience

The concept of experience as defined by Schiller and Dewey implies the same contrast. For Schiller experience is a subject-matter which is psychical, cognitive, and subjective.⁴ Truth is made out of this experiential material and, therefore, must be psychical, cognitive, and subjective. According to Dewey we must either think of experience in terms of empirical or scientific method or else think of it as introspective psychology does, that is, as a subject-matter or stuff.⁵ We cannot think of it in both senses; we must make a choice. Dewey chooses the first alternative. For him experience is empirical or scientific method, and as such is not momentary, private, or psychical.⁶ A truth-making

¹Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 47.

²T. V. Smith, "Review of The Quest for Certainty by John Dewey," Religious Education, XXV (1930), 71-73.

³Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 251. See also ibid., p. 107.

⁴This is implied by his self-psychology. See supra, pp. 13 and 14.

⁵Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp. 1, 30.

⁶Ibid., pp. 23, 101.

which goes on in connection with such an experience could not be psychical or subjective.

Schiller and Dewey in Relation to Formal Logic

The psychological character of Schiller's theory of truth accounts at least in part for his pronounced antagonism to formal logic. Formal logic can give us only verbal meaning and is therefore worthless.¹ It is "nonsense fortified by technicality."² In an article published after his death on "Logic, a Game, or an Agent of Value," Schiller has this to say about formal logic:

So long as formal logic is not eradicated root and branch, we can have no logic that is more than a trivial play with words, no logic that can recognize the actual procedures of human knowledge in their integrity, no logic that can understand and justify the methods of science, that can be on speaking terms with psychology. . . .³

It may also be added that Schiller, as we would expect, excluded symbolic logic.⁴

On the other hand, Dewey makes a definite place for formal logic. The instrumental theory is a logical doctrine and it "sets much store upon the apparatus of deduction."⁵ Knowing begins and ends in experience, but "the idea, the meaning, which the original observations suggest and the final ones test, itself requires careful scrutiny and prolonged development."⁶ This latter process, deduction, is the elaboration of hypotheses, the fourth stage in Dewey's description of the reflective process.⁷ As to

¹Morris, "A Review of Must Philosophers Disagree? by F. C. S. Schiller," Personalist, XVI (1935), 389. See also Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 53.

²Dewey, "A Trenchant Attack on Logic," Independent, LXXIII (1912), 203.

³Schiller, "Logic, a Game, or an Agent of Value" (the second article in a series under the general title: "The Personalistic Implications of Humanism"), The Personalist, XIX (1938), 28. See also Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 319 and Schiller, Formal Logic (2d ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931), p. vii.

⁴Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 206, n. 1. See also Schiller, Formal Logic (2d ed.), p. vii.

⁵Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 148.

⁶Ibid., p. 148. See also ibid., pp. 148-155.

⁷Morris, "Relation of Formal Logic to Instrumental Logic,"

symbolic logic, it may be stated that the instrumentalists as a whole take a more favorable attitude toward it than does Schiller.

Practical versus Non-Practical Needs

Closely connected with Schiller's opposition to formal logic and the merely theoretical is the fact that for him all thinking is biological or practical.¹ On the other hand, Dewey, in his theory of truth makes a place for the satisfaction of non-practical needs. According to him, thinking arose in a practical situation but now the organism has developed needs which are not practical, and thinking functions in their satisfaction as well as in the satisfaction of practical needs.² Thinking is always instrumental to some interest but it is not always instrumental to some practical need. This Deweyan position harmonizes with his attitude toward formal logic.

Schiller and Dewey in Relation to Epistemological Dualism

Schiller is certainly dualistic in his introspective psychology. Here he has an inner mental realm over against an outer physical world. We shall find out later that in his metaphysics matter is opposed to the human mind and God to that which is not-God.³ Schiller's theory of truth is so subjectivistic that it has been charged with solipsism. However, Schiller has specifically denied this accusation.⁴ He also rejects solipsism elsewhere.⁵ His theory of truth implies a "determinable indetermin-

Essays in Philosophy, ed. by T. V. Smith and W. K. Wright (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1929), p. 268.

¹See supra, pp. 26-29.

²Montague, Ways of Knowing, p. 134 footnote--second section.

³Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx, pp. 302-306.

⁴Schiller, "Instrumentalism and Idealism," Mind (N.S.), XXXIV (1925), 78. See also S. P. Lamprecht, "An Idealistic Source of Instrumentalist Logic," Mind, XXXIII (1924), 425.

⁵Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays (2d ed. enlarged; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1912), pp. 256-57. See also Schiller, "The Relativity of Metaphysics" (the fourth and last article in a series which was published posthumously under the general title: "The Personalistic Implications of Humanism"), The Personalist, XIX (1938), 251.

nate matter"¹ or $\hat{v} \lambda n$,² a truth and a reality as limitative conceptions which man does not make.³

Dewey is a leader in the "revolt against dualism." Epistemologically he holds to a "realism without monism or dualism."⁴ He is an empirical or pluralistic realist and has absolutely no interest in epistemological monism.⁵ Dualism for him is "only two monisms stuck loosely together, so that all of the difficulties in monism are in it multiplied by two."⁶

Consciousness for Dewey is not a separate realm or existence over against the body. It is only "the manifest quality of existence when nature is most free and most active."⁷ The concept of behavior furnishes the basis for unity in the human individual and in human action. This position saves us from "all the questions which constitute that species of confirmed intellectual lockjaw called epistemology" as it substitutes for the dualism of mind and body the pragmatic procedure which is concerned only with "the relation to one another of different successive states of things."⁸ Body and mind are only functions, the former "stands for the means and agencies of conduct," and the latter "for its incorporated fruits and consequences."⁹

Consciousness for Schiller, the epistemological dualist, is unlike, external to and independent of matter. The making of truth for him, then, must be a process which goes on in consciousness. This inevitably makes truth individualistic and subjective. On the other hand, Dewey's epistemological doctrine, pluralistic

¹Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 434.

²Schiller, "Axioms as Postulates," Personal Idealism, Henry Sturt (London: The Macmillan Co., 1917), p. 60.

³Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 433.

⁴Dewey, "Realism without Monism or Dualism," Journal of Philosophy, XIX (1922), I, 309-317 and II, 351-61.

⁵Dewey, "Duality and Dualism," Journal of Philosophy, XIV (1917), 491-93.

⁶Ibid., p. 491. See also Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 149.

⁷Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 393.

⁸Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, p. 51, footnote.

⁹Ibid., pp. 306, 302.

realism, fits perfectly into the claim already made that his theory of truth is social and objective.

Some Concluding Observations

Most of Schiller's writings are devoted to the establishment of a theory of knowledge which is empirical and relativistic. He does this first by constantly pointing out the inadequacies of the absolutistic views and second by showing that empirical relativism fully meets the demands of an adequate theory of knowledge. With this two-fold achievement Schiller's work to a large extent comes to an end. It is best represented by his Formal Logic and his Logic for Use. All of his other writings which bear upon his theory of truth, in a large measure, cover the same ground. Dewey, in his writings, does what Schiller has done, but he does not stop with that. He analyzes and develops the features of empirical relativism in more detail.

Next to this general divergence which has to do with the breadth of the field surveyed, is the contrast that is due to their underlying psychologies. Schiller describes his humanism in terms of concepts which are psychological, mentalistic, and subjectivistic, while Dewey presents his instrumentalism in terms of categories which are objectivistic, behavioristic, and logical. This was illustrated by our discussion of such concepts as meaning, context, purpose, and relevance. This difference between the two theories of truth seems to me to be neither a mere matter of emphasis nor an affair of minor importance. It makes the difference between a theory of truth which fits into an idealistic world-view and one that harmonizes with a naturalistic world-view.

Let us summarize some of the other differences which exist between humanism and instrumentalism. Experience for Schiller is psychical and subjective while for Dewey it is naturalistic and objective. For Schiller thinking, experiment, the scientific, and scientific method deal with an experience which has two types of data--subjective and objective. On the other hand, for Dewey they have to do with an experience whose data can be interpreted objectively. Both men hold that thinking arises in connection with the problematic,¹ but Dewey analyzes the act

¹Schiller, Logic for Use, pp. 87, 110.

of thought much more fully than Schiller. There are five steps in thinking for Dewey¹ while for Schiller thinking stands alone; preceded by a non-intellectual activity--stopping to think, and succeeded by action and survival--two non-intellectual activities.² Further, the whole process of thinking is objective for Dewey and subjective for Schiller. Schiller speaks of prediction in several places, and he no doubt approaches the thought of "verified prediction" sometimes, but he does not make it an essential part of his test of truth as Dewey does. Schiller's test of truth is primarily individualistic and secondarily social. In contrast to this, Dewey's test is primarily social and secondarily individualistic. Dewey is opposed to both epistemological and ontological dualism while Schiller only rules out the second. Instrumentalism makes a valid and worthwhile place for formal logic while humanism denounces it as worthless. However, we are not sure that the difference here is as marked as it seems at first. The formal logic which Schiller seems to be so hostile to is logic which is "purely formal,"³ mediately as well as immediately divorced from all meaning and use. Inference is mediately but not immediately practical for Schiller.⁴ Thus a certain place is made for the theoretical, although that which is purely theoretical is excluded. Closely connected with Schiller's attitude toward formal logic is the claim that he makes all thinking practical or biological. The major portion of the evidence supports the truth of this claim even though Schiller defines the "useful" as a means to an end and states that psychologically, "any end will do."⁵ Many times he emphasizes the fact that truth is practical. Thinking is to help us on to more successful living. By means of it we can better adjust ourselves to our environment and thus live longer and with less distress and disaster.⁶

One other fact should be mentioned. It is not just

¹Dewey, How We Think, chap. vi.

²Schiller, "Ethics, Casuistry and Life," The Personalist, XIX (1938), 168, 169.

³Dewey, "Memorial to F. C. S. Schiller."

⁴Schiller, Logic for Use, pp. 267 and 268.

⁵Ibid., p. 159.

⁶Ibid., pp. 95, 171.

meaning that Schiller makes all-important, it is personal meaning. The humanist logic "repudiates the abstraction from personality which formal logic has always practiced and prescribed to all science."¹ Thus the whole of Logic for Use in this emphasis upon personal meaning assumes the existence of an unanalyzed human personality. This ultimate concept is basic for Schiller's theory of truth. Add to this his tendency toward psychophysical dualism and his emphasis upon tastes and attitudes as ultimate and one finds reason to believe that even in his theory of truth he does not escape metaphysics, even though he does think that traditional transcendentalism should be avoided in this field.

¹Ibid., p. 440. See also ibid., pp. 53, 64, 68, 158.

CHAPTER IV

TWO THEORIES OF VALUE

Introduction

One of the charges brought against pragmatism in the early days of its history was that it made no place for values. It was so busy elaborating the means whereby values are to be made more secure that it failed to give proper attention to values themselves. But now that it has had time to mature and thus develop its various features, it is seen to be in reality a value philosophy. Professor T. V. Smith has declared that Dewey's value theory is not only the hub of his philosophy, but it also constitutes the chief contribution of pragmatism to current philosophy.¹

This chapter will be devoted to a comparison of Dewey's and Schiller's theories of value. So far as the writer of this paper has been able to discover, these two theories of value have not been considered previously in specific relation to each other. We shall notice as we compare them that there is a vital relation between each and its author's particular type of psychology.

Value and Criticism for Dewey

Dewey reserves the word value for a criticized liking or good.² To some extent this is just a matter of terminology, and yet the situation as a whole cannot be explained thus. Dewey admits that all likings except the first dumb experience have in them a germ of criticism. This is true to such an extent that he often calls all likings "immediate values." They are "meanings

¹Smith, "Dewey's Theory of Value," Monist, XXXII (1922), 339.

²Perry, General Theory of Value (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926), p. 123. See also Dewey, "Values, Liking and Thought," Journal of Philosophy, XX (1923), 617 and 618; Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 260 and 261; Dewey, "Valuation and Experimental Knowledge," Philosophical Review, XXXI (1922), 328 and 329.

due to the expansion of earlier meanings."¹ Moreover, his theory of immanent meanings carries with it the thought that even the original experience with which his process of evaluation begins has an element of cognition in it. But in spite of all of these admissions, Dewey still prefers to apply the term value to thoughtful liking rather than to mere liking. Just as truth is the result of the resolution of a problem so value or thoughtful liking is an experience which arises when a conflict of goods has been resolved by reflection that culminates in choice. Referential meanings are exchanged for enriched immanent meanings. The unique characteristic of the end chosen as "the good" is its impregnation by those meanings whose expansion determined the choice.

Most of life is made up of these intrinsic values or consummatory experiences, and Dewey is primarily interested in them. They are present experiences which are the climax of an enriching process, and as such they are concrete illustrations of Dewey's categorical imperative: "So act as to increase the meaning of present experience."²

The process of evaluation which we have just outlined is behavioristic.³ Thought and liking are to be interpreted in terms of Dewey's behavioristic psychology. We have noted too that the outcome of this process is the result of the solution of a problem. But this outcome is arrived at by means of criticism rather than by means of experimentation. Nevertheless, we should be as exacting in our criticism as the experimenter should be in his experimentation. We must appraise carefully, for what we appraise will be reappraised.⁴

Dewey's theory of value is identical with his theory of criticism, and his theory of criticism is co-extensive with phi-

¹Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp. 402 and 403. See also O. A. H. Pell, Value-Theory and Criticism (New York, 1930), p.50, footnote.

²Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 283. See also E. S. Brightman, "A Review of The Quest for Certainty by John Dewey," Religious Education, XXV (1930), 76, and G. C. Field, "A Review of Human Nature and Conduct by John Dewey," Mind, XXXII (1923), 84.

³Dewey, "Valuation and Experimental Knowledge," The Philosophical Review, XXXI (1922), 327, n. 1.

⁴Pell, Value-Theory and Criticism, p. 52.

losophy. Philosophy is a "criticism of criticism."¹ It is the critical operation and function become aware of itself and its implications, and pursued deliberately and systematically. All types of experience, scientific, moral, and esthetic, exhibit alike

the difference between immediate goods casually occurring and immediate goods which have been reflectively determined by means of critical inquiry. If bare liking is an adequate determinant of values in one case, it is in the others. If intelligence, criticism, is required in the one, it is in the others. All cases manifest the same duality and present the same problem; that of embodying intelligence in action which shall convert casual natural goods, whose cause and effects are unknown, into goods valid for thought, right for conduct, and cultivated for appreciation.²

Thus intelligence is critical method applied to the goods of belief, conduct, and appreciation in order to construct freer and more secure goods. To put it in another way, science (usually thought of as outside of the realm of value altogether) is for Dewey just a specialized form of that same process of reflective inquiry that constitutes criticism in whatever field it may occur, and thus enters directly into the creation of values.

Value and Criticism for Schiller

Schiller defines value as "a personal attitude, of welcome or the reverse, towards an object of interest."³ Mere liking, a motor-affective element, is value. This liking is an attitude and an attitude is "a subjective addition to the facts" for Schiller.⁴ This means that Schiller's theory of value is based on his introspective or subjectivistic psychology. This liking or attitude is, therefore, necessarily personal and Schiller emphasizes this fact. The category of personality is supreme in value experience as it is in all other types of experience for him.

"The provisional definition of value as essentially a personal attitude, as a recognition of the supremacy of the category of personality, has maintained itself and proved a clue to

¹Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp. 394-410. ²Ibid., p.407.

³Schiller, "Value," Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. by James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner Sons, 1922), XII, 589.

⁴Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 39.

the labyrinth of values."¹ Thus Schiller makes an unanalyzable personality basic in his theory of value as he did in his theory of truth. Here we have something with innate tastes and ultimate attitudes, an indefinite, mysterious, metaphysical factor which is involved in the creation of values and in beliefs about them.

This may account for the fact that we do not meet with a consummatory or end-value phase of experience in Schiller's theory. He has an immediate experience but it is cognitive and is something which we go from but to which we do not return.

Schiller does not identify value with criticism. Neither does he identify criticism with philosophy. However, he does hold that criticism is one of the chief occupations of a critical philosophy. He also makes a place for the criticism and consequent revision of values. Immediate values may at any time become data which are to be reappraised. The following quotations verify this fact:

Hence the values which are psychically data, and psychologically immediate, may always be logically mediated and made objects of valuation-processes and explicit value-judgments. They then function as facts to be evaluated.²

The explanation perhaps is that error and failure are possible in all human operations, and hence also in the estimation of values. The values which are claimed are subject to revision and correction, and, if it is decided that they are, but ought not to be, they can be called either "false" or "wrong"; for it is intrinsically as legitimate to use the value predicates of logic as those of ethics to describe their failure.³

Schiller's theory of value, like his theory of truth, has no clearly defined conflict or problem scheme, a pattern which we find, on the other hand, in all of Dewey's philosophy. Schiller does, however, agree with Dewey and of course with all other pragmatists, in refusing to put fact and value in mutually exclusive realms. Formally, logic is the best in the way of belief and value is the best in the way of good, in any particular situation. There is no such thing as pure fact or pure value.⁴

¹Schiller, "Value," Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, XII, 589.

²Ibid., p. 588.

³Ibid., p. 587.

⁴Ibid., p. 586.

Transvaluation

The element of criticism of which Dewey and Schiller make so much implies that there is a factor of change in the world of values. Values which are always subject to criticism must be values which are always subject to change. Transvaluation is a concept which is common to both theories of value.¹ Some values are more stable than others but none will ever become absolutely and eternally fixed. Dewey holds consistently to this position but Schiller, as we shall see later, makes a place in his metaphysics for the unchangeable.

Another implication of criticism is a standard by means of which the criticism is made. Both Dewey and Schiller insist on having standards, but for the former all standards are internal, that is, they are a part of the process of criticism itself. They enter into and help to constitute value. This is at least one reason why Dewey contends that there is no value without criticism. "Criticism must not be an external standard, but the outgrowth of a factor already contained in the value situation."²

This insistence of Dewey on going ahead step by step, this refusal to set up anything as external and absolute form, is based on his belief in "the power of common life to develop its own regulative methods and to furnish from within itself adequate goals, ideals, and criteria."³

From a second point of view Dewey's standards may be said to be external. They are external in that satisfaction and value-judgments, the components of value, are as psychological processes defined behavioristically.

Schiller at times seems to attempt to escape the notion of an external standard but he certainly is not successful. His general idealistic philosophy involves him in the belief in an external standard with its scale of values.⁴ This will be much

¹Ibid., p. 588. See also Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 386.

²Dewey, "The Meaning of Value," Journal of Philosophy, XXII (1925), 131.

³Pell, Value-Theory and Criticism, p. 53. See also Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 395 and Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 266; Dewey (chap. iii), Living Philosophies (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1931), p. 27.

⁴Schiller, "Value," Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, XII, 586.

in evidence when we study his ethical concepts as well as when we consider his metaphysical and religious theories. Values are criticized or judged by means of external norms. In the second place, we must bear in mind the fact that criticism as a process is internal or subjective for Schiller. The value-judgment is a psychical process.

The Objectivity of Value

What is the attitude of these men toward the objectivity of value? Dewey's position has been variously interpreted. Some have claimed that he holds to the objectivity of value while others have been just as sure that he does not. The problem involved in this difference of opinion can be solved if we get clearly in mind what Dewey means by "objectivity." He would not define it in terms of what is usually understood by objectivity--an absolute which holds in himself or itself all reality, truth, and value. His is not a metaphysical or transcendent objectivity. The objectivity real for him is that "whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be." He would add that only persistent and conjoint inquiry "enables us to give intelligible meaning in the concrete" to this definition. "This is the pragmatic way out of the egocentric predicament."¹ Here we have objectivity identified with social universality.

The epistemological escape from the egocentric predicament by getting an ego which includes the standpoint of others is analogous in value theory to the getting of a self which includes within itself the values of others.²

Thus we find that Dewey believes in the objectivity of value but it is an objectivity which fits into his theory of criticism as a process which goes on within a situation that is social. It is also the type of objectivity which we would expect to find in an objective relativism.

Schiller describes the validation of values thus: Values are value-claims, postulates, hypotheses, which are to be validated, that is, supported and confirmed by experience. This veri-

¹Dewey, "The Pragmatism of Peirce," Journal of Philosophy, XIII (1916), 715.

²Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. xxxii. See also ibid, pp. xxix, xxvii, xxviii.

fication is an unending process which never attains to that which is absolute. The amount of evidence necessary to establish the validity of a value is relative to the subject-matter, the situation involved and the individual who is doing the evaluating. This causes much difference of opinion, and makes the process of validation a long one.

Validity is the status that a value acquires after it has been subjected to the process of validation, and validity is defined as a "high, or generally recognized and practically indisputable, degree of value."¹ It is not to be inferred from this that value is merely subjective, a gratuitous addition to facts.² It is compatible with any sort and degree of objectivity. Reality not only contains and manifests value, but value is also the acme of its significance for us.³

The two preceding paragraphs have given a résumé of Schiller's view of validation and validity as he stated it in his article on "Value" in Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. This discussion is pragmatic in character and its description of validation and validity, like that of Dewey, identifies objectivity with social universality. However, this is not the whole story for Schiller. His conception of ethics, religion and metaphysics, as expressed elsewhere, undoubtedly adds to this social objectivity a metaphysical objectivity. To ignore this would be to misrepresent Schiller's total theory of value. It should also be understood that in the section which follows, the writer takes into consideration more than the article referred to above.

Some Ethical Concepts Contrasted

It will throw light on Dewey's and Schiller's theories of value if we compare some of their ethical concepts. Take the concept of ends, for instance. For Dewey there are two types of ends: natural and moral. The former are only changes in a connected series of events, closings of temporal episodes from one standpoint and beginnings of them from another. These ends are not causal. All directional order resides in the sequential

¹Schiller, "Value," Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, XII, 588.

²Ibid., p. 587.

³Ibid., p. 589.

order. This rules out final and efficient causes as these terms have been generally understood.¹ Dewey explains moral ends as follows:

By "ends" we also mean ends-in-view, aims, things viewed after deliberation as worthy of attainment and as evocative of effort. They are formed from objects taken in their immediate and terminal qualities; objects once having occurred as endings, but which are not now in existence and which are not likely to come into existence save by an action which modifies surroundings.²

These moral ends from another viewpoint are means or instruments, foreseen consequences which influence present deliberation and finally bring it to rest by furnishing an adequate stimulus to overt action. In this sense they are "terminals of deliberation" and so turning points in action, directive stimuli which unify and liberate conflicting habits and impulses.³ This concept of moral ends harmonizes with Dewey's claim that outcomes of desire are beginnings of new acts and good is not future but is to be found in the meaning of present activity.⁴

Schiller's view of ends is very different. The supreme value of Summum Bonum is the worth of life as a whole. This comprehensive ideal includes four realms of value--logical, aesthetic, ethical, and hedonistic. Optimism and pessimism are innate and ultimate attitudes. Ideals conceived of as attainable result in optimism, while the consequence is pessimism if they are thought of as unattainable. Life may be condemned as not worth living because it nowhere provides for man to attain perfect happiness, full knowledge, complete goodness, or aesthetic harmony. If one is convinced that the search for truth is futile, it will be difficult for him to think of aesthetic, ethical, and hedonistic ends as within the grasp of human effort. Thus his entire scheme of goals will collapse and life as a whole will cease to have value; that is, pessimism will follow. This makes pessimism always secondary, the sequel to the breakdown of some optimistic scheme of value.⁵

¹Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp. 98-100. ²Ibid., p. 104.

³Ratner, Philosophy of John Dewey, p. 354. See also Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 431.

⁴Ibid., p. 366.

⁵Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays (2d ed. enlarged), pp. 157-164.

Is there then a science which gives an orderly account of the ends of life that are or should be aimed at? Surely ethics is as much of a science as abstract metaphysics, and if it be the science of ultimate ends, it seems to follow that our ultimate metaphysics must be ethical.¹

Thus ethics is at one stroke recognized as the science of ultimate ends and the final basis of metaphysics.

Dewey interprets ends as plural, instrumental, and internal from the standpoint of the process which characterizes nature or "the moving whole of interacting parts," while Schiller thinks of them as external and synoptic, capable of being classified under a Summum Bonum. The former is naturalistic and positivistic while the latter is idealistic and transcendental. Schiller evidently mixes the meaning of Dewey's natural and moral ends and this according to Dewey is "one of the Great Bads of Philosophy."²

Both Dewey and Schiller contend that freedom is essential to ethics. In general, freedom means that man is responsible, to some extent at least, for some of his deeds. The central concept in Dewey's theory of freedom is thought and not will. A free act is an intelligent or purposive act. "We are free in the degree in which we act knowing what we are about. The identification of freedom with 'freedom of the will' locates contingency in the wrong place."³ Schiller associates freedom with willing, and willing for him is a function of an agent or person. He asserts that men have an immediate consciousness of this freedom, and that humanism accepts the same at its face value. Freedom means risk, chance, the possibility of change, of improvement, a determinate indetermination of a nature which is plastic, incomplete, and still evolving.⁴

Schiller claims that immortality is a necessary ethical postulate. Without it as a goal for the individual, that is, if death ends all, the moral life cannot be lived out, moral perfec-

¹Ibid., p. 105 and Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 154. See also Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree? p. 131.

²Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 104.

³Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 238. See also Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, pp. 151, 152, 274-76; Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 202.

⁴Schiller, Studies in Humanism, pp. 356, 357. See also Schiller, The Riddles of the Sphinx (new and revised ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1910), pp. 445-59.

tion is impossible, and the universe cannot be regarded as at heart ethical.¹ Connect this with Schiller's contention that the collapse of one realm of value means the disintegration of all, and a negative attitude as to individual immortality implies pessimism as to the value of life as a whole.² Therefore, belief in immortality holds a very important place in Schiller's theory of values. It is no surprise that he has made a life-long study of immortality and believes that the argument for it is logically sound and metaphysically legitimate.³ He also thinks that belief in immortality is psychologically of great significance for most men.

Dewey is wholly at odds with Schiller as to individual immortality. His pronounced opposition to the transcendental, the extra-empirical, or the supernatural as modes of explanation or reference would in itself exclude all pre-occupation with belief in immortality.⁴ Such a belief could have no place in his ethical thought or theory of values. Dewey states that he almost totally dissents from the position taken in Schiller's essay entitled: "Philosophy and the Scientific Investigation of a Future Life."⁵ He also writes thus: "I have no interest in the old, old scheme of derogating from the worth of knowledge in order to give an uncontrolled field for some special beliefs to run riot in."⁶ One of the beliefs mentioned in this connection is that of immortality. Dewey even doubts that belief in immortality "(as distinct from hope on one side and a sort of intellectual balance of probability of opinion on the other) can genuinely exist at all."⁷

Everywhere we turn in our study of Dewey's theory of value we discover criticism, intelligence at work striving to make the

¹Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays (2d ed. enlarged), pp. 251-65.

²Ibid., p. 157. ³Schiller, Problems of Belief, pp. 58-65.

⁴Dewey (chap. 111), Living Philosophies, p. 28.

⁵Dewey, "Review of Humanism: Philosophical Essays by F. C. S. Schiller," Psychological Bulletin, I (1904), 335.

⁶Dewey, Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 194.

⁷Ibid., n.l. See also Dewey, "Immortality," New York Times, LXXVII (1928), sec. 9, 1.

values we have more secure. The functioning of moral ends and freedom are also examples of this activity. This criticism is not a stranger or foreigner; it is working within nature. On the other hand, Schiller to the extent that he gives attention to criticism which is according to external standards, to ends which are external and finally synoptic, and to value which is metaphysically objective, joins the ranks of the idealists in affirming the security of values. Value is supernatural and at least to some extent alien to nature.

CHAPTER V

METAPHYSICS AND RELIGION

General Similarities

In taking up the study of Dewey's and Schiller's theories of reality, we shall consider first the points at which they converge. Both theories have an emergent or evolutionary factor in them. For Dewey there are four levels of the interaction of natural events--physical, psychophysical, mental and social. Each of these stages is named in the order of its complexity. The most complex, the social, is the "inclusive philosophic idea or category."¹ Life and mind have a part in this emergence but they are not responsible for all of it. In other words, the world "as a whole" is not known to be "vital or sentient or intelligent."² Schiller agrees with Dewey in emphasizing change. His philosophy is a metaphysics of change. It begins with God, other spiritual beings, good and evil, a pre-existent chaos, and from this state of affairs moves on to a harmonious society of perfect individuals, an active and yet changeless and eternal state of being, an ultimate.³ Schiller differs here in two respects from Dewey. There is an end to the change, and personality is the only dynamic factor in the change while it is going on.

Monism does not fit easily into a scheme where there is real change. The latter is usually found associated with pluralism in philosophy. This is certainly the case with Dewey and Schiller. Their philosophies are pluralistic. For Dewey reality

¹Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp. 252-73, 290. See also Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, pp. 77-92.

²Morris, Six Theories of Mind, p. 274. See also Dewey, "The Subject-Matter of Metaphysical Inquiry," Journal of Philosophy, XII (1915), 344.

³Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx (new and rev. ed.), pp. 413-25. See also Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree? pp. 207-209; Schiller, Humanism, Philosophical Essays (2d ed. enlarged), p. 204; J. S. Bixler, Religion in the Philosophy of William James, p. 40; James, Pragmatism, p. 159.

is a moving whole of interacting parts or processes and each of these processes is the interaction of an organism and an environment.¹ Schiller, as we have already indicated, holds to a pluralism of persons. He postulates a God with whom other spiritual beings are associated. Just as change comes to an end for Schiller so his pluralism culminates in a higher synthesis which at least borders on monism.² Thus we find that Dewey's pluralism, like his change, is more genuine and thoroughgoing than that of Schiller.

Neither Dewey nor Schiller would claim that his view of metaphysics is final. Changing realities as well as the recognized limitations of human intelligence would preclude such dogmatism. Schiller, however, brings in another factor which he makes the major cause of the tentativeness of metaphysical systems. This is personal idiosyncrasy. He emphasized this factor more and more as the years passed.³ Here again we see the dominance of the personal and subjective--a characteristic of everything which comes within the range of human experience.

Immediate Empiricism versus Transcendental Empiricism

Dewey rejects all noumena or transcendental reals. He begins with experience and ends there. Reality is to be found in the actual run of events in experience.⁴ In other words, events are the concrete realities which constitute experience.⁵ In this world of experience, immediate or non-reflective experience, the world which is there or that which is on the perceptual level, is our starting point. Reflective or mediate experience functions wholly in connection with this immediate experience. It arises out of it, functions in behalf of it, and then returns again

¹Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 291.

²Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx (new and rev. ed.), p. 349.

³Schiller, Logic for Use, pp. 452, 454. See also Schiller, "Why Humanism?" Contemporary British Philosophy (first series), ed. by J. H. Muirhead (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924), p.409; Schiller, "The Relativity of Metaphysics," The Personalist, XIX (1938), 244 and 245.

⁴Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 86.

⁵Ibid., p. 71.

into it.¹

Even metaphysics is empirical. It has to do wholly "with the nature of the existential world in which we live," that is, the world of experience.² It is the cognizance or registration of the common or generic traits of existence.³ Among these are the precarious and the assured, the incomplete and the finished, the repetitious and the varying, the safe and sane and the hazardous.⁴ These traits of existence intersect everywhere in experience.⁵

This empiricism is seen also in Dewey's view of philosophy. Philosophy is a method, a criticism of criticism, which deals with the common traits of existence and their intermixture in so far as they bear upon life and conduct. As such it creates no world of reality de novo. It is not a peculiar organ of access to highest and ultimate truth.⁶ It gets its knowledge from science and everyday life, and therefore, has no body of knowledge which is peculiarly its own.

Schiller claims to start with immediate experience. He has much to say about a primary or psychological or immediate reality or experience or presentation which is chaotic and unformed. This is the given stuff or raw material, the something that is found and not made, out of which everything else is to be made. This original experience is reconstructed by the intellect in the interest of the whole personality. In doing this the human being postulates whatever noumena or transcendent reals seem necessary.⁷ So long as these noumenal realities function in the reorganization of this primitive experience, that is, have practical value in assisting the individual to adjust himself to his environment, they are retained. When they fail to do this they are abandoned. The first and most important and valuable infer-

¹Smith, "Dewey's Theory of Value," Monist, XXXII (1922), 342, 343.

²Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 45.

³Ibid., p. 413. See also ibid., p. 51.

⁴Ibid., p. 75. See also ibid., p. 59.

⁵Ibid., p. 395.

⁶Ibid., pp. 407-410.

⁷Schiller, Studies in Humanism, pp. 470-71, 222.

ence from experience is the individual's personality. Here his traditional or transcendent metaphysics begins. In addition, he assumes the existence of other human persons, the physical world, and God.

Schiller's metaphysics is empirical, then, in the sense that all of its inferences must be based on experience. These inferences cannot be a priori or independent of experience. In other words, metaphysics has for its province the unification or interpretation of all experience. It takes "the deliverances of the special sciences" and all other "relevant evidence from direct experience and so combines and interprets them as to formulate a consistent and adequate philosophy of life."¹ This evaluation is based on the personality of the metaphysician.² Thus personality is made all-important and central and the limited viewpoint of the sciences--the abstraction from personality--is seen to be methodological and not final.³

Schiller tends to identify metaphysics and philosophy. One's metaphysics is his philosophy of life. In this sense, philosophy is certainly not wholly empirical for Schiller. It is an inference from the facts of experience; it has a body of knowledge peculiarly its own which, while based on experience, goes beyond it, and the conclusions which it postulates have to do with highest and ultimate truth.

Objective Relativism versus Personal Idealism

What has gone before in the discussion of Dewey's metaphysics points to the fact that his philosophy is an objective relativism. The world of immediate experience is a world of events or interactions. Events rather than objects are substantive. Objects are characters of events. This opens the way for objective relativism.⁴ Relativity and objectivity are no longer

¹Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 360. See also Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree? pp. 8-9.

²Schiller, "Why Humanism?" Contemporary British Philosophy (first series), ed. by J. H. Muirhead (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924), p. 409.

³Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 452.

⁴A. E. Murphy, "Objective Relativism in Dewey and Whitehead," Philosophical Review, XXXVI (1927), 121.

incompatible. Objects are relative to the human organism but they are not in consciousness. They are objective processes within the environment, although they are partially generated by the organism. Chairs, stars, cats, dogs, electrons are objects with meanings, the subject-matter of consciousness, but they are as much a part of the environment as the waves which the swimmer makes are a part of the water. They are the interaction of the human organism and its environment just as the waves are the interaction of the swimmer and the water. Scientific objects are not the reality of which experience is the appearance. They are only "the designation of an abstracted relational structure. The real or true objects of science are those which best fulfill the demands of secure and fertile inference."¹

Mind and matter are different characters of natural events. Matter expresses the sequential order of events and mind the order of their meanings in their logical connections and dependencies.² Mind is the whole system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of organic life.³ Consciousness is that portion of these meanings which is undergoing transformation at any particular moment.⁴

This view might also be called an empirical naturalism or a naturalistic realism. It certainly cannot be classed with idealism, materialism, or empiricism in the traditional sense of these terms. Neither is it the type of full-fledged realism which holds that the object is wholly generated apart from the organism, an object which has only external relations.

Schiller's metaphysics gives us a personal idealism. From the first edition of Schiller's first book, The Riddles of the Sphinx, which was written before he became a humanist, to his last article, which appeared posthumously in a recent number of the Personalist, Schiller has shown himself to be an idealist of a certain type. Humanism as he himself has declared has an affinity for personal idealism.⁵ His attitude toward the finality of his system of metaphysics has changed considerably down through the years but its essential content has not varied to such a great

¹Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 437.

²Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 74. ³Ibid., p. 303.

⁴Ibid., p. 308. ⁵Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 19.

extent. This last article referred to above which was published under the title of "The Relativity of Metaphysics" and which was the last in a series of four articles having the general title, "The Personalistic Implications of Humanism," states that his Protagorean Humanism seems to have very definite applications to the stock controversies of metaphysics. The various naturalisms, materialisms, and behaviorisms it easily disposes of by showing that they leave out, in their calculations, man and human personality, and misinterpret scientific method.¹

He also declares that humanism alone seems capable of leading to a genuine idealism.² Then he closes this last article with his favorite dream argument. He asserts that there is only one sound argument for idealism, and that is this argument from dreams. If dreams are subjective, they prove that idealism may be true by establishing the fact that we can create subjective worlds. Second, they suggest that our real world may be a dream world,³ and that there may be more such dream worlds--higher or lower.

But we must state a little more specifically the nature of this personal idealism. Persons with God at their head constitute the ultimate reality. The whole human person rather than just human reason is made the type-phenomenon. It is the starting-point of all of his thinking and is made the basis for his assumption as to the nature of ultimate reality. The phenomenal reality of the material world is recognized.⁴ An atom is "a constant manifestation of divine force or will, exercised at a definite point."⁵ As defined, the atom is inorganic or unconscious. Space is a product of the divine force just as is the case with matter. Time is a necessary characteristic of a developing order, the corruption along with becoming of an eternal being. "Time is but the measure of the impermanence of the imperfect."⁶

¹Schiller, "The Relativity of Metaphysics," The Personalist, XIX (1938), 250.

²Ibid., p. 251.

³Ibid., pp. 253-54.

⁴Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx (new and rev. ed.), pp. 270, 271.

⁵Ibid., pp. 267-72.

⁶Ibid., p. 257. See also Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree? p. 285. Here Schiller sanctions the definition of time which he had given forty years before.

Thus the "objective" world in space and time would be the direct creation in our consciousness of the divine force, and represent merely a state or condition of our mind, which need not exist at all, except for a being in that condition. Yet it would be the only reality and the primary object of knowledge for such a consciousness.¹

Matter is the interaction that goes on between God and human beings who are at least to some extent independent of and distinct from God.² It is the function of matter to limit mind until the latter develops to such an extent that it can be relied upon to act more rationally.³

Metaphysics Instrumental for Dewey and Practical for Schiller

According to Dewey, man does not just naturally note and describe the common traits of existence.⁴ He is not naturally metaphysical because metaphysics is not naturally practical. However, metaphysics has a function to perform. It is the ground-map of the province of philosophy and thus outlines philosophy's field of activity.⁵

If we follow classical terminology, philosophy is love of wisdom, while metaphysics is cognizance of the generic traits of existence. . . . Man is naturally philosophic, rather than metaphysical or coldly scientific, noting and describing. Concerned with prudence if not with what is honorifically called wisdom, man naturally prizes knowledge only for the sake of its bearing upon success and failure in attaining goods and avoiding evils.⁶

On the other hand, Schiller undoubtedly thinks of metaphysics, the final synthesis of all of the sciences, as immediately practical to the person who formulates it.⁷ It lifts him above the limited view which the sciences necessarily give him when they, as far as they can, abstract from personality and personal idiosyncracies. Since these are especially important facts of experience, a person can not hope to properly adjust himself to his environment without taking them into consideration.

¹Ibid., p. 273.

²Ibid., p. 274.

³Ibid., p. 292. See also supra, pp. 35 and 36.

⁴Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 51. ⁵Ibid., pp. 59, 413.

⁶Ibid., p. 51. See also Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 18.

⁷Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 21.

The Concept of God

For Schiller, God is a moral principle of help and justice, something to respond to the outcry of the human heart. He is also an aid to the intellectual apprehension of the universe.¹ Rational arguments support the belief in a finite God only. Nevertheless, Schiller goes so far as to declare that there may be an infinite God.² The fact that we can only prove the existence of a finite God may be due to our limitations and not God's. Dewey favors the use of the term "God," but his God is not personal. He has made it clear that he is not a theist.³ God is for him the unity of ideal ends and values which have authority over our lives plus the forces in nature and society which generate and support these ideals, and the action that gives them coherence and solidity.⁴ More briefly and in his own words: "It is this actual relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name God."⁵ The concept of God as thus defined is all-important for Dewey. The difference between a personal God and a God that is the unity of all ideal ends and values "is the ultimate issue as to the difference between a religion and the religious function of experience."⁶

The Concept of the Supernatural

Closely allied to the concept of God is the concept of the supernatural. Schiller's belief in a personal God, personal immortality, and religious experience as unique, indicates that he makes a decided place for the supernatural. This is corroborated by the fact that he asserts that there is an unusual amount

¹Ibid., pp. 285-88. See also ibid., p. 136, and Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx (new and rev. ed.), p. 12.

²Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree? p. 305.

³E. E. Aubrey and others, "Is John Dewey a Theist?" Christian Century, LI (1934), 1550-1553. See also A. E. Haydon, "The Theological Trend of Pragmatism," American Journal of Theology, XXIII (1919), 410. Here Haydon emphasizes the fact that a thorough-going instrumentalism rules out the hypothesis of a personal God.

⁴Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), pp. 43-50.

⁵Ibid., p. 50.

⁶Ibid., p. 43.

of coincidence between his and James's personal "over-beliefs."¹ It is also proven by the fact that he accepts the transcendent as that which is based on metaphysical inference.² At this point Dewey is diametrically opposed to Schiller. In his earlier writings the former tells us that religion is universal, a natural expression. There is no supernatural realm. There is no breach between man and the world. Man does not need divine assistance. The positive creed of life implicit in democracy and science must be developed.³ In his recent book, A Common Faith, he rejects "the necessity for a supernatural Being and for an immortality that is beyond the power of nature."⁴ At another place he states that he has no belief as to immortality.⁵ This is in accord with his notion of God as impersonal and his acceptance of the religious as an attitude that may be taken toward every object and every proposed end or ideal rather than religion which manifests itself in human experience as something unique.⁶ It also harmonizes with his contention that there are no special truths which are religious by their own nature and no peculiar avenues of access to such truths.⁷ Dewey makes a place for the transcendent but he defines it empirically.⁸ Thus it loses its extra-empirical or traditional character. A quotation from Professor E. A. Burt is relevant here:

I take it that it is in the light of these factors that we should interpret Professor Dewey's doctrine that scientific method is the method of all right thinking and that philosophies claiming either private or super-scientific access to truth are misusing the latter term and leading their adherents into an exceedingly tempting snare but mischievous delusion.⁹

¹Schiller, "Definition of Pragmatism and Humanism," Mind (N. S.), XIV (1905), 240.

²Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx (new and rev. ed.), p. 275.

³Ratner, The Philosophy of John Dewey, pp. 503-506.

⁴Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 6.

⁵Dewey, "Immortality" (A Symposium), New York Times, LXXVII (1928), sec. 9, 1.

⁶Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 10.

⁷Ibid., p. 32.

⁸Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 425.

⁹Burt, "Two Basic Issues in the Problem of Meaning and of Truth," Essays in Honor of John Dewey, p. 77.

The General Relation of Humanism and Instrumentalism to Religion

This comparison of the views of Dewey and Schiller as to religion would be incomplete without a consideration of the general relation of instrumentalism and humanism to religion. We shall reverse the order and begin with humanism. Schiller always felt as did James that pragmatism in general and humanism in particular were closely related to religion. In his earlier writings he states that the will-to-believe has sanctioned the faith-attitude of religion, and since it is a philosophical principle it has thereby brought to light the universal character of the same. Thus the postulates of religion and science have been placed on a common footing.¹ Pragmatism affords protection against naturalism and should be especially appreciated by those who are interested in a spiritual view of life.² In his later writings, he tells us that his humanism has no connection with non-theistic religious humanism. His doctrine is purely an epistemological theory.³ However, it is opposed to naturalism as well as absolutism and has a human interest in religion as a big fact in human nature.⁴ Much of the evidence for humanism is found in the field of religious phenomena, and humanism explains and to some extent justifies the faith-attitude or will-to-believe of religion.⁵

This claim as to the close relation between humanism and religion is corroborated by others. Professor J. S. Bixler writes thus:

Pragmatism's interests and emphases are preeminently those of religious faith, its attitude is preeminently that of the will to believe. . . . Pragmatism's beliefs are . . . forward-looking demands made upon the universe for the satisfaction of subjective needs, among which the moral and religious needs are prominent. Pragmatism clearly has much more in common with the religious view, where the objects of belief must always remain unknowable, than with the scientific view where the correspondence relation may be a thing of chief importance.⁶

¹Schiller, Studies in Humanism, pp. 135-36. See also ibid., p. 353 and Schiller, "Pragmatism," Encyclopaedia Britannica (14th ed.), XVIII, 414.

²Ibid., p. 158.

³Schiller, Must Philosophers Disagree? p. 308, n.1.

⁴Ibid., p. 313.

⁵Ibid., pp. 313-16.

⁶Bixler, Religion in the Philosophy of William James, p. 99.

The book from which the above quotation is taken contends that James's religious philosophy deserves a place in the front rank of his work. Schiller in reviewing the book comments thus: "In essentials, it seems to me, Professor Bixler makes out his case. The religious side of James's pragmatism is valuable and vital, and must not be slurred over."¹ Dewey himself has said that pragmatism was for James a via media between natural science and the ideal interests of morals and religion.² Caldwell writes as follows of the relation of Schiller's philosophy to religion: "The mystical, religious man will find in Schiller a treatment of philosophy as the justification of an essentially spiritual philosophy of life."³ Hook puts the matter much more emphatically when he expresses himself thus:

Schiller's offer of pragmatism to the theologian as the best device for saving their religion scandalized me as such a piece of philosophical prostitution that I was blinded to the worth of his writings on the nature of hypotheses.⁴

Dewey has never seemed to feel that there was any special bond between instrumentalism and traditional religion. He completely rejects the will to believe form of pragmatism with its affinity for traditional religion.⁵ As we have already indicated, instrumentalism is openly hostile to the metempirical as it is held to by traditional religion.⁶ Dewey is aware of the desire for the superhuman, the transcendental, but he claims that this longing is a weakness to be ignored.⁷ We are better off to forget about God and all extra-empirical assistance. Thus we are

¹Schiller, "A Review of Religion in the Philosophy of William James by J. S. Bixler," Mind (N. S.), XXXVI (1927), 510.

²Dewey, Character and Events, ed. Joseph Ratner (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1929), I, 116.

³W. Caldwell, Pragmatism and Idealism (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1913), p. 17.

⁴Sidney Hook, "Experimental Naturalism," American Philosophy Today and Tomorrow, ed. by H. M. Kallen, and Sidney Hook (New York: Leon Furman, Inc., 1935), p. 214.

⁵Dewey, "Realism without Monism and Dualism," Journal of Philosophy, XIX (1922), 315.

⁶Dewey (chap. 111), Living Philosophies, p. 28.

⁷Dewey, "Does Reality Possess Practical Character," Essays Philosophical and Psychological (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1908), p. 79.

left to work out co-operatively our salvation. It has been said that in Dewey's instrumentalism and immediate empiricism positivism and pragmatism unite and pave the way for Dewey to become the father of present-day non-theistic humanism.¹

In connection with this discussion of Dewey's attitude toward religion, it should be said in all fairness to him, that he is not opposed to the functions of religion. In fact, he believes that they are very important. However, he does not believe that they can be effectively preserved and enhanced by means of the traditional beliefs of the Christian religion.

Schiller's review of Dewey's recent book, A Common Faith, confirms the divergencies which exist between his and Dewey's view of religion. He dissents from Dewey's contention that you can be religious without having a religion, and also from Dewey's claim that belief in the supernatural paralyzes the action of men. He believes that Dewey discounts the psychological argument from religious experience and mysticism, and he questions that we can co-operate for the sake of values until we agree as to values, and agreement is not likely.² And then he concludes the review thus:

Lastly, let me say a word in behalf of the individual soul, presumably superior to the average, that is surfeited and sick from social rites and ceremonies. He has been bred and fed on them, and has found them neither palatable nor sustaining. They seem to him obsolete and barbarous, and indeed at bottom devil-worship. What use is it to preach conformity to him? What comfort can he find in religion a la Dewey?³

This last statement is another example of Schiller's emphasis upon the individual as over against Dewey's emphasis upon the social.

¹W. P. King, Humanism, Another Battle Line (Nashville: Cokesburg Press, 1931), pp. 33, 263. See also A. C. Knudson, The Philosophy of Personalism (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1927), pp. 397-405, and E. S. Brightman, Religious Values (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1930), pp. 145-51.

²Schiller, "A Review of A Common Faith by John Dewey," Mind, XLIV (1935), 398.

³Ibid., p. 399.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Some General Contrasts

We begin this chapter by presenting three contrasts between Dewey's and Schiller's theories of truth. The first one is the scientific versus the metaphysical. There is a scientific characteristic which stands out in Dewey's theory of truth. The theme of instrumentalism is the function of thought in experience. Faith in intelligence is "the one and indispensable belief necessary to moral and social life."¹ "Philosophy is concerned with the import and presence in the universe of human reflective intelligence."² Add to this constant and central emphasis upon intelligence the fact that thought is an experiment, that is, that the typical form of knowing is that which is found in experimental science, and we cannot help but admit the importance of the scientific factor in Dewey's theory of truth. This is verified by a significant statement from one of Dewey's recent books, A Common Faith. It reads as follows: "There is but one sure road to truth--the road of patient cooperative inquiry operating by means of observation, experiment, record and controlled reflection."³ Let us place beside this quotation another which is even more definite. "The method we term 'scientific' forms for the modern man (and a man is not modern merely because he lives in 1931) the sole dependable means of disclosing the realities of existence. It is the sole authentic mode of revelation."⁴ In contrast to this dominant scientific tendency in Dewey's theory of truth is Schiller's emphasis upon metaphysics. Whatever we may say as to the other pragmatists, we certainly cannot say that metaphysics

¹Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, p. 35.

²Morris, "Peirce, Mead, and Pragmatism," The Philosophical Review, XLVII (1938), 111.

³Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 32.

⁴Dewey (chap. 111), Living Philosophies, p. 24.

was an afterthought with Schiller. His first book, Riddles of the Sphinx, was on metaphysics and his early humanistic writings gave a large place to this field of thought. His thinking was so permeated with metaphysical inclinations that he permitted metaphysics to dominate his theory of truth. This is proven by the fact that he bases his theory of truth on a psychology which is built on and gathered about a personality which is ultimate and unanalyzable. Truth to be truth at all must lie within the psychical life and satisfy the needs of a person. Of course in Schiller's books one will find plenty of sincere talk about science and the scientific method but it is always a science and a scientific method which are subservient to this fundamental leaning which is evident even in his theory of truth.

Closely related to this contrast between the scientific and the metaphysical tendencies in Dewey's and Schiller's theories of truth is the logical as over against the psychological strain. Dewey's theory of truth manifests a logical bent. Instrumentalism's emphasis upon intelligence, which we have already discussed, points in the direction of a high regard for logic. What has already been given along this line may be supplemented by another quotation from Dewey. In it he answers the charge that instrumentalism is anti-intellectualistic.

How can instrumentalism which holds that intelligence is the only sure method of achieving the good in consequences be anti-intellectualistic in the sense you describe? It is anti-intellectualistic only with reference to certain theories about intellect, theories which seem to me to isolate knowledge from its connections, empirical and metaphysical.¹

This logical element in Dewey's theory of truth is also seen in the fact that formal logic is not only accepted but also given a legitimate and necessary function. Deduction is the fourth stage in Dewey's process of thinking. Along with this is the fact that the instrumentalists have not outlawed symbolic logic. Dewey's theory of truth meets the logical requirement that its test be objective and universal. Based on a psychology which is a social behaviorism it furnishes us with a test of truth which is objective and social or universal. Instrumentalism is pre-eminently a logical doctrine. Dewey himself speaks of instrumentalism as the logical version of pragmatism.² (It should be said, however, that

¹See Montague, Ways of Knowing, p. 134, n. 1.

²Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 331.

Peirce also stressed the view that pragmatism was a logical doctrine.) The situation is very different with humanism. Schiller completely excludes purely formal and symbolic logic. These sciences not only have no value for him, but are also the source of much waste of time and positive misconception. This antipathy for purely formal and symbolic logic is the negative side of a voluntarism or anti-intellectualism which pervades humanism. "In his Preface to Logic for Use, Schiller declares that he has substituted Voluntarism for Humanism in order to sharpen the antithesis to the old logics."¹ All of this indicates that Schiller's theory of truth is psychological and not logical. It gives us a psychology of beliefs rather than a test of what is true. This accords with Schiller's tendency to identify logic with psychology as well as his practice in giving a dominantly psychological interpretation to such categories as meaning, context, relevance and purpose.²

A third and last contrast between Dewey's and Schiller's theories of truth is that of the social versus the individualistic. The test of truth for Dewey is social. It must be because the immediate situation with which he deals is itself social. Individual psychology is an abstraction. "It is only against the common, social, shared world that the individual distinguishes his own private world."³ Thought is social, an interaction or behavior. Dewey's psychology logically compelled him to develop a social test of truth. He declares that the final issue of the empirical method is "whether the guide and standards of beliefs and conduct lie within or without the shareable situations of life."⁴ Schiller's theory of truth, on the other hand, is individualistic. It cannot be immediately social because the test of truth is a process which must go on in an individual mind, a mind possessed by a person. This test is necessarily psychological, or better psychical, and as such is individualistic. It can be immediately social but a mediate test of truth can never meet the demands of an immediate situation. This individualism in Schiller's test of truth is an inevitable outcome of the mentalism

¹Dewey, "Memorial to F. C. S. Schiller."

²Ibid.

³Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. xxix.

⁴Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 38.

and subjectivism which goes with his type of psychology. The same might have been said in regard to the psychological character of his theory of truth which we discussed in contrast to the logical character of Dewey's theory. In concluding this phase of our comparison we shall quote at some length from a recent address by Dewey. It will bear on the logical-psychological dissimilarity as well as the social-individualistic. The quotation reads as follows:

In his Preface to the more negative and critical work, Formal Logic, Schiller expressed the hope that that work might be provisional, and succeed in superseding the need for its existence. The extent to which it has been superseded in fact upon one side is a measure of the success of his work, while upon the other side the way in which it has been superseded is probably a measure of his failure to accomplish what he hoped to accomplish. Schiller, because of his experience as a teacher of logic at Oxford, felt acutely that logic has remained in the curriculum as a literary subject, and hence "exempted logicians from the salutary study of scientific knowing." That remark could hardly be made about the present status of logical theory. On the other hand, the general temper of our day is marked by a revulsion against earlier mentalism and subjectivism. The persistence of that strain in Schiller accounts, I think, for the fact that while logic has greatly changed, it has not changed precisely in the direction he hoped for.¹

Logical Empiricism versus Fideism

Professor R. B. Perry has recently declared that one of the issues in James's philosophy "appears at the moment to have become the central issue of philosophy." He refers to the "advance of 'instrumentalism' and Operationalism in the experimental sciences, of symbolism in logic, and of logico-experimental positivism in sociology and philosophy." This new cult, which is "the fitting philosophical expression of an age of technology," "threatens a profound and epochal change in the intellectual life of the Western world." "This cult teaches that knowledge, in the maximal or preferred sense, deals with signs and experimental operations."² Now this logical empiricism, which from one standpoint at least is a development of a certain phase of James's philosophy, has not been championed by Dewey. Nevertheless, the scientific and logical elements in Dewey's theory of truth point

¹Dewey, "Memorial to F. C. S. Schiller."

²Perry, In the Spirit of William James (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), p. 121.

in the direction of logical empiricism. This is further substantiated by the fact there is a feeling on the part of some that logical empiricism and instrumentalism have much in common. This is the case to such an extent that there are those who declare that it is not unreasonable to think of pragmatism and logical empiricism "as different phases within a common movement."¹ Thus we get the end toward which Dewey's pragmatism seems to be moving.

Schiller's humanism, on the other hand, with its metaphysical, psychological, and individualistic characteristics, manifests no tendency toward logical empiricism. The dominant elements in his humanism substantiate his expressed opposition to logical empiricism. What phase of James's philosophy, then, does Schiller tend to emphasize in his theory of truth? It seems to us that when one gets down to the last analysis he finds that Schiller has given us in his humanism a glorified or universalized fideism. This view stands at the opposite extreme from logical empiricism. Professor Perry differentiates between pragmatism and fideism thus:

Pragmatism is the application of practical principles to the theoretic process itself; fideism is the justification, on practical grounds, of over-belief--that is, of belief which lacks conclusive theoretic support. The one discovers the practical procedure of theoretic proof, the other affirming the practical right to believe in the absence of such proof.²

It seems to us that when Schiller's unreserved antagonism to formal and symbolic logic with their emphasis upon the theoretical is considered along with his insistence upon the fact that the satisfaction of a practical need is always the test of whether an idea is true, there is no escape, in the light of the above definitions, from the conclusion that Schiller's humanism is a glorified or universalized fideism. Added support is given to this contention when it is remembered that Schiller's truth-process goes on within a field of consciousness which is psychological and individualistic because it is possessed by an unanalyzed personality, a personality which is itself an over-belief. Not only is this the case, but all truths which reach at all beyond one's own immediate experience must be postulations or over-beliefs

¹Morris, "Peirce, Mead and Pragmatism," The Philosophical Review, XLVII (1938), 125-27.

²Perry, In the Spirit of William James, p. 71.

based on their practical value, their value in satisfying personal needs. Schiller's fictionalism in science, his strong religious bias, his repeated emphasis upon the will to believe or fideistic type of knowing, his feeling that humanism and religion are closely related--all point toward the interpretation of humanism which we are offering. The fact that Dewey with his trend toward logical empiricism completely rejects the will to believe type of James's thought indirectly substantiates our position. Thus we have a glorified or universalized fideism set over against a theory of truth which has much in common with logical empiricism; a metaphysical-psychological-individualistic theory of truth contrasted with a scientific-logical-social theory; a faith attitude versus a scientific attitude.

The Source of the Divergencies

What is the explanation of these extreme divergencies which exist between instrumentalism and humanism? I believe that it is to be mainly accounted for by their different views of experience. In many respects the concept of experience is the most important concept to be found in these two theories of truth. Both of these men, as we have already learned, began their philosophical careers as believers in an absolute experience. Both men revolted against this view. The significant fact, however, is that these two revolts did not take the same course. Dewey's change was much more radical. His reaction to the absolute or supernaturalistic experience resulted in an emphasis upon experience as naturalistic. This concept of experience is naturalistic because it is objective, that is, it is something which transpires in nature. Schiller, on the other hand, in his reaction to the absolute or superhuman experience, made central the concept of experience which traditional psychology had held. This concept of experience is subjective, monopolistically possessed, because it transpires within a human consciousness. Each man felt that the type of experience which he finally selected was absolutely essential to his thought. Besides, each was convinced that there was no middle ground between the two concepts of experience. They were mutually exclusive. We must either think of experience naturalistically, that is, as characterized within empirical or scientific method, or else we must think of it as a possession of an individual person.

Dewey's naturalistic concept of experience laid the foundation for a theory of truth which was to be scientific, logical, and social. It gives us a pluralism of events, interactions, or behaviors which are objective in nature, and therefore capable of being dealt with experimentally. Besides, the experimental interactions or social behaviors make possible a common test of truth, a test of truth which is logical and can be applied to the immediate situations or presents. Further, Dewey's concept of experience in providing for his theory of truth also provided for his trend toward logical empiricism. Schiller's concept of experience as a subject-matter or stuff implied a personality by which it might be possessed. A human personality was necessary to a human experience of that sort. Thus Schiller was lead at once into a theory of truth which was metaphysical, psychological, and individualistic. There was no way for him to escape this outcome since he had chosen the type of experience which he had. It was also inevitable that his test of truth would be personal and subjective. It could not be either theoretical or experimental. It would have to be practical, the satisfaction of personal needs. Finally, a theory of truth which is metaphysical, which has to make transcendental assumptions, and which makes them only on practical grounds, is fideistic. Schiller's concept of experience logically drives him into a theory of truth which is fideistic.

Experience and Metaphysics

What about the metaphysics of Dewey and Schiller? Can we explain their differences as to the concept of reality by their different views of experience? I believe that we can. Dewey's objective relativism makes nature an organization of events or perspectives. This can be accepted as a theory of reality because it is based on a concept of experience which is not subjectively or psychically private and therefore solipsistic. Again, his theory of reality is empirical through and through even to the noting of the generic traits of existence. He does not have to fall back on any transcendental factors as means of explanation. Only an experience which is naturalistic and objective could make possible a metaphysics such as we have described. It must always be remembered that in all of this sphere of reality Dewey's instrumental intelligence is still functioning. It is a

critical intelligence at work, and in its every activity it must approach as nearly as possible the standard set for it by scientific experimentation. Schiller's situation is very different. His type of experience drives him into subjective relativism. It locks him up in a consciousness which is possessed by an individual person. This cannot be final for it is solipsistic and Schiller himself declares that only a mad man would hold to solipsism. Nevertheless, the only way that he can get out of this predicament is by way of traditional transcendentalism. He has to assume the existence of other persons and of physical things. These assumptions are preceded by the assumption of the existence of his own personality. Thus his empiricism has to be a transcendental empiricism. This transcendental empiricism culminates in personal idealism since Schiller makes that which is ultimately transcendental, personal. The human personal experience is made the type-phenomenon--the Divine experience is patterned after it. It is interesting to note in this connection that Schiller's one great argument for the assumption of these transcendental factors is that they have practical value, they aid the individual in better organizing his primary experience and thus satisfy personal need. This harmonizes with his claim as to the ethical or practical basis of metaphysics. Given, then, Dewey's conception of experience and it is easy to arrive at his theory of reality, while on the other hand if one starts with Schiller's concept of experience, one will finally be forced into some form of transcendentalism.

Dewey's theory of value with its theory of criticism and its social objectivism fits into his concept of experience and his related emphasis both upon thought as an experiment and upon social behaviorism. In contrast to this, the transcendentalism, which Schiller's concept of experience compels him to adopt, provides him with metaphysical objectivity for his theory of value and also makes possible his external standards and tables of value.

Non-Philosophical Sources of the Divergencies

In concluding this discussion we shall suggest several non-philosophical reasons for the divergencies of thought between Dewey and Schiller. The non-philosophical factor which we shall mention first is a fundamental difference in personality. It is the same difference which might be pointed out in connection with

Plato as contrasted with Aristotle or Whitehead as contrasted with Russell. Schiller had an introverted and Dewey an extroverted personality. Professor V. E. Fisher, in his recently published treatise on psychology, declares that

the most distinguishable characteristic of the personality variant known as introversion-extroversion is: in introversion a subjective orientation of attention and interest; in extroversion an objective orientation of attention and interest.¹

Schiller's decided emphasis upon a personal, subjective experience would indicate that he had an introverted personality, while Dewey's development of a naturalistic, objective experience would place him in the class with those who have an extroverted personality. This conclusion is further substantiated by another quotation from Fisher's book. It reads as follows:

That extremely objective system of psychology which is known as behaviorism has been invented and propounded for the most part by psychologists of strongly extroverted personalities. And subjective and introspectionistic systems of psychology have been supported for the most part by psychologists of strongly introverted personalities.²

Dewey would come within the first group and Schiller within the second.

Professor Fisher continues this analysis of the two types of personality with the statement that the introverted person's interests tend to be few and intensive, while those of the extroverted person tend to be numerous and extensive.³ This harmonizes with the great variety and multiplicity of Dewey's writings and interests as over against Schiller's fewer interests and writings. Schiller has been more polemical and dogmatic in his positions. This would indicate that his interests were more intensive than those of Dewey. This contrast between the introverted and the extroverted person's interests can also be related to Schiller's narrower as over against Dewey's broader view of experience. Closely connected with this difference is the fact that the introverted person is less social than the extroverted person.⁴ We

¹V. E. Fisher, An Introduction to Abnormal Psychology (rev. ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937), p. 38. In introducing this distinction between Schiller and Dewey, I want to make it clear that I agree with Professor Fisher when he makes the terms "introvert" and "extrovert" signify only differences in type. He does not believe that the introvert is superior to the extrovert nor vice versa. Each type has both good and bad qualities in about equal measure. See ibid., pp. 36-41.

²Ibid., p. 35.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 40.

cannot pass on the sociability of either Schiller or Dewey but we do know that Schiller's concept of experience commits his philosophy to a strain of individualism. On the other hand, Dewey's concept of experience implies a sociality which is one of the distinguishing marks of his thought. There is reason to believe, then, that Schiller was an introverted and Dewey an extroverted personality. This difference in personalities has undoubtedly had something to do with the dissimilarities in their philosophies.

Second, we would mention the social situation in England as compared with that in this country. It was more aristocratic and also much older and more conservative--less susceptible to change in thought. This would tend to prevent Schiller from breaking completely with his earlier forms of thought. No doubt this situation had something to do with the fact that he retained a form of idealism as his final philosophy. Dewey did not have this restraining influence to the same extent in his social environment and, therefore, it was easier for him to break completely with idealism.

The next factor which we would consider is the education of the two men. Schiller took his undergraduate work at Oxford and then did considerable graduate work at Cornell University in this country. Thought at Oxford at that time was completely dominated by absolute idealism, and the same was true of Cornell. Scientific experimentation in any of the social or humane subjects was unknown in these two institutions then. This educational environment inevitably made some impression upon Schiller. Dewey received his education at the University of Vermont and Johns Hopkins University. Philosophy at these two institutions was also idealistic but there was more interest in scientific experimentation at Johns Hopkins University than at most universities. As an educational institution it was founded for graduate work where special recognition was to be given to the scientific spirit. There is reason to believe that Dewey might have been influenced to some extent by the general scientific atmosphere of this new institution of learning.

More important than the influence of the institutions where these two men were educated was the general educational situation in England and America. James had already come on the scene in this country. He was first a scientist of the experimental type and only later a philosopher. From physiological

experimentation he passed on to psychological experimentation. He came to philosophy dominated by a scientific and empirical interest which had much to do with turning back the tide of absolute idealism in this country. England at this time had no man who was doing the work there which James was doing here. The development of scientific experimentation, especially in the field of psychology, was consequently retarded. James Ward, Stout, and others were doing a great work in psychology, but it was not along experimental lines. This condition made it practically impossible for Schiller as he went back to Oxford to teach to inaugurate and develop experimentation in psychology and related sciences. Besides, he was needed to do then just what he did--carry on a militant warfare against absolute idealism. He had to do in a sense what James had already done here. This no doubt in part accounts for the fact that Schiller did but very little scientific experimentation at any time during his life. He was connected with the Society for Psychical Research for more than forty years but it offers little opportunity for scientific experimentation. He also gave some attention to eugenics, but his work in this field was not experimental. He was not an experimentalist in the field of biology. With Dewey the whole situation was different. He taught for a brief period at the University of Michigan and then came to the newly founded University of Chicago. He soon found himself in the midst of the development of functional psychology, an outgrowth of James's psychology. Experimental science became his chief interest. His "Laboratory School" became famous for its experimental work in educational psychology. When all of this is taken into consideration, it is easy to understand how Dewey has given us a philosophy which not only centers on reflective intelligence but also defines this reflective intelligence as an experiment.

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